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Abstract
In electricity markets where competition has been established for a long time, a nuclear
operator familiar with the operation of such markets could be interested in the optimal long-
term management of a flexible nuclear set (like the French) in a competitive market. To obtain
a long vision of the optimal management of a nuclear set, we realize a full inter-temporal
optimization of the production which results from the maximization of the value of generation
over the whole game. Our model takes into consideration the periodical shut-down of nuclear
units to reload their fuel, which permits to analyze the nuclear fuel as a stock behaving like
a reservoir. A flexible nuclear reservoir permits different allocations of the nuclear fuel during
the different demand seasons of the year. Our analysis is realized within a general deterministic
dynamic framework where perfect competition is assumed and two flexible types of generation
exist: nuclear and thermal non-nuclear.
The marginal cost of nuclear production is (significantly) lower than the one of non-thermal
production, which induces a discontinuity of producers’ profit. In view of this price disconti-
nuity, a “regularization” of the merit order price is achieved within our numerical model which
leads to an alternative optimization problem (regularized problem) that constitutes a good ap-
proximation of our initial problem. We also prove that in the absence of binding productions
constraints, solutions are fully characterized by a constant nuclear production. However, such
solutions do not exist within our numerical model because of production constraints that are
active at the optimum.
Finally, we study the maximization of social welfare in an identical framework. Similarly,
we demonstrate that in the absence of binding production constraints a constant non-nuclear
thermal production is a characteristic property of solutions of the social welfare maximization
problem.
Key words: Electricity market, nuclear generation, inter-temporal optimal reservoir oper-
ation, competition with reservoir, price discontinuity, social welfare.
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2Re´sume´
Dans les marche´s de l’e´lectricite´ ou` la concurrence a e´te´ e´tablie depuis longtemps, un ex-
ploitant nucle´aire familiarise´ avec le fonctionnement de marche´s concurrentiels pourrait eˆtre
inte´resse´ par la gestion optimale d’un parc nucle´aire flexible (comme le franc¸ais) a` long terme.
Pour obtenir une vision longue de la gestion optimale d’un parc nucle´aire, nous re´alisons une
optimisation inter-temporelle de la production qui re´sulte de la maximisation de la valeur de
la production sur le jeu entier. Notre mode`le prend en conside´ration les arreˆts pe´riodiques
des unite´s nucle´aires pour recharger leur combustible, ce qui permet d’analyser le combustible
nucle´aire comme un stock que l’on ge`re comme un re´servoir. Un re´servoir nucle´aire flexible per-
met des allocations diffe´rentes du combustible nucle´aire pendant les diffe´rentes saisons de de-
mande de l’anne´e. Notre analyse est re´alise´e dans un cadre dynamique de´terministe ge´ne´ral, ou`
la concurrence est suppose´e parfaite et deux types de production flexibles existent: le nucle´aire
et le non-nucle´aire thermique.
Le couˆt marginal de production nucle´aire est (significativement) infe´rieur a` celui de produc-
tion non-thermique, ce qui induit une discontinuite´ de profit des producteurs. Compte tenu de
cette discontinuite´ des prix, une “re´gularisation” du prix merit order est re´alise´e au sein de notre
mode`le nume´rique qui conduit a` un proble`me d’optimisation alternative (proble`me re´gularise´)
qui constitue une bonne approximation de notre proble`me initial. Nous montrons aussi que
quand les contraintes de production ne sont pas sature´es, les solutions sont entie`rement car-
acte´rise´es par une production nucle´aire constante. Toutefois, de telles solutions n’existent pas
au sein de notre mode`le nume´rique en raison des contraintes de production qui sont actives a`
l’optimum.
Enfin, nous e´tudions la maximisation du bien-eˆtre social dans un cadre identique. De la
meˆme fac¸on, nous de´montrons que en l’absence de saturation des contraintes de production, une
production non-nucle´aire thermique constante est une proprie´te´ caracte´ristique des solutions
du proble`me de maximisation du bien-eˆtre social.
Mots cle´s: Electricite´, technologie nucle´aire, “re´servoir” de combustible nucle´aire, gestion
intertemporelle optimale des re´servoirs, compe´tition parfaite avec re´servoir, suivi de charge,
demande saisonnie`re, discontinuite´ des prix, bien-eˆtre social.
JEL : C61, C63, D24, D41, L11.
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31 Introduction
In electricity markets where competition has been established for a long time, a nuclear ope-
rator familiar with the operation of such markets could be interested in the optimal long-term
management of a flexible nuclear set (like the French) in a competitive market. In our previous
paper (see Ref. [23]), we assumed that the nuclear managers are just quitting the former
vertically integrated monopoly organization and discovering how competitive wholesale markets
work. In view of this assumption, we modeled the optimal behaviour of flexible nuclear plants
month by month by taking into consideration the production constraints imposed by generation
capacity and nuclear fuel storage as well as the supply-demand equilibrium constraints. This
could be explained by the fact that they cannot immediately manage all the factors affecting
the market equilibrium in the medium term as well as the significant number of constraints
determining a feasible production vector, hence they reduce their management horizon to that
proportion of the market that is easier to apprehend: the monthly horizon. This analysis
constituted a reasonable starting step to determine what the optimal management of a flexible
nuclear set should be in a perfectly competitive electricity market. In this paper, we will
assume that a nuclear producer knows how to behave in a market based operation framework.
In addition to this, it has a better knowledge of the management of a flexible nuclear set on
a monthly basis operation thanks to the study of its optimal per month production behaviour
realized in our previous paper. Consequently, under these assumptions, a reasonable next
step for a nuclear manager could be the determination of the optimal long-term management
of a flexible nuclear set (like the French) in this competitive setting. In order to obtain a
long-term vision of the optimal management of flexible nuclear plants, we realize a full inter-
temporal optimization of the production which results from the maximization of the value of
generation over the whole game. Market based management of flexible nuclear plants would
then proceed with the determination of the global optimum of the optimal inter-temporal
production problem. Our model takes into consideration the periodical shut-down of nuclear
units to reload their fuel, which permits to analyze the nuclear fuel as a stock behaving like a
reservoir. A flexible nuclear reservoir permits different allocations of the nuclear fuel during the
different demand seasons of the year. This analysis makes sense in a theoretical level however,
it does not exist an economic literature which permits to have knowledge on this particular
topic.
A key characteristic of the nuclear electricity generation technology compared to other
generation technologies consists in the conjunction of very high fixed costs and relatively low
production costs. This leads to a differentiation of the nuclear generation technology from
the fossil fuel generation technologies (e. g. coal, gas, fuel oil) with respect to the mode of
operation. In view of the existing economics of nuclear (see Ref. [19]), the nuclear plants should
run all year at maximum capacity since that helps covering its fixed costs. On the contrary, gas
or coal power plants realize a load follow-up by adjusting their production to load variations
during a year. This mode of operation of nuclear could be “easily” applied in electricity systems
organized as vertically integrated monopolies (see Ref. [8]).
In the French case, however, the operation of the nuclear generation set is not of that
kind because of the significantly high share of nuclear generation in the energy mix (78% of
nuclear in total domestic electricity generation). Consequently, the french nuclear set needs
to be “flexible”: nuclear units should be operated to follow a part of the demand variations
instead of behaving as rigid base load units (see Ref. [14]). Indeed, according to the Report
of monitoring of the Commission of Regulation of Energy (CRE) in 2007, the nuclear set was
used to meet not only the “base” demand (share of constant consumption throughout the year),
but also a part of the “semi base” demand (share of variable consumption). In particular, the
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4majority of the stops of the nuclear plants to reload their fuel was programmed in summer (low
demand season in continental Europe) which made it possible to release the main part of the
nuclear capacities in winter (high demand season) (see Ref. [15]). Thus, the nuclear production
contributed to respond to the daily and seasonal variations of the demand. Since the vertically
integrated monopoly regime of electricity systems has been replaced by an operation constrained
by competitive markets (see Ref. [6]), we could assume that nuclear operators have learned
how to behave within these markets. In such a competitive framework, one can ask what is the
optimal management of a flexible nuclear set in the long-term?
We focus on the medium-term horizon as we did in our previous paper in which a nuclear
manager has to allocate its output according to the different seasons of the year. Once again,
we emphasize two time seasons differentiated by their demand levels: a “high demand” season
(winter) and a “low” demand season (summer). A main characteristic of the optimal operation
of a flexible competitive nuclear fleet is that the fuel of the nuclear reactor can be viewed as
a “reservoir” of energy partly similar to the water reservoir of hydro storage stations. As we
mentioned in our previous paper, nuclear units stop periodically in order to reload their fuel.
Then, producers set the amount of the reloaded nuclear fuel which is limited and exhaustible
according to the forecasted demand levels during a year. In view of the different demands
and pricing characteristics of seasons, there are different profiles of nuclear fuel uses. In this
paper, a nuclear generator being familiar with the operation of a competitive market and of a
nuclear fuel reservoir is interested to obtain a long vision of the optimal operation of the nuclear
reservoir throughout the entire time horizon of the game. Thus, it realizes an inter-temporal
optimization based on the direct optimization of the nuclear fuel use over the entire period of
the game. This mode of inter-temporal optimization will then be contrasted with the results
of the per month optimization.
Finally, in view of the progressive augmentation of the electricity price for consumers induced
by the growing demand, the recent increase of the price of nuclear per MWh sold by the French
historical operator to alternative producers, the massive investment in renewable, etc, we are
interested in determining production vectors (nuclear, thermal non-nuclear) that maximize the
utility of both producers and consumers. Thus, we study the social welfare maximization
problem in a competitive electricity market where producers dispose both nuclear and thermal
non-nuclear generation technologies. Our goal is to determine the optimal production and
storage levels that maximize social welfare by taking into account constraints imposed by
nuclear fuel storage and generation capacity.
In section 2, we start with the modelling of the inter-temporal management of “market
based” flexible nuclear reservoirs in a perfect competitive setting. In section 3, we study the
symmetry of equilibrium of the optimal inter-temporal production problem while in section 4,
we proceed with the optimization of this problem. In section 5, we run numerical tests of our
model with the set of data described in subsection 5.1 and by using Scilab. Finally, in section
6, we focus on the social welfare maximization problem. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model: Perfect competitive case
In this section, we present our general deterministic model of a perfectly competitive electricity
market where the producers operate both with nuclear and thermal non-nuclear plants. The
hypothesis considered in this model are similar to those assumed in the model presented in our
previous paper. More precisely, a perfect competition is assumed meaning that firms are price-
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5takers1: they treat price as a parameter and not as a choice variable. We also assume perfect
equilibrium between supply and demand and perfect information among producers. First, our
modelling aims at determining the inter-temporal optimal management of the nuclear genera-
tion set in that competitive regime. Once again, we focus to the medium-term horizon which
is characterized by the seasonal variation of demand between winter and summer. Second,
we take into account generation capacity and fuel storage constraints that are decisive for the
determination of the equilibrium outcomes in this wholesale electricity market. Finally, we
look at the social welfare maximization problem by taking into consideration these production
constraints. For simplicity reasons and in the absence of access to detailed data the electric-
ity importations/exportations are not taken into account within our model. However, in the
hypothetical case that electricity importations/exportations were part of our modelling, they
could be considered either exogenous or endogenous to our model. If they were exogenous then
the demand would be translated by the production that is imported/exported which would
not modify our modeling. On the contrary, if they were endogenous, the complexity of the
modelling would increase since several new parameters have to be taken into account in our
model e.g. technical constraints imposed by the transmission power lines, the price elasticity
of foreign demand, etc.
2.1 Modelling the demand
We make the assumption that the demand, being exogenous, is perfectly inelastic. As we
mentioned in our previous paper, this assumption is obviously a simplification motivated by
some arguments: in short-term to medium-term the demand is already determined by previous
investments in electrical devices and ways of life whose evolutions require time, thus it is less
sensitive to price. Let us also remind that electricity is sold to consumers by retailing companies
which pay the wholesale spot prices directly to the producers. There is no bilateral contracting
regime between retailers and producers.
Furthermore, the monthly demand is translated by the aggregate monthly hydro produc-
tion coming from the run-of-river hydro units. The run-of-river hydro units have little or no
capacity for energy storage, hence they can not co-ordinate the output of electricity generation
to match consumer demand. Consequently, they serve as base load power plants. Since the
hydro technology with no reservoir (run-of-river) is a base load generation technology which
is presumably never marginal, it is necessary to call up nuclear to cover the different levels of
demand. We do this translation in order to remove the part of the base load demand served
by the run-of-river hydro units and thus to obtain a more clear vision of the demand which
will be served by the nuclear and non-nuclear thermal units. The seasonal variations of hydro
production due to precipitation and snow melting are not taken into consideration, thereby
we assume that the aggregate monthly hydro-production is constant through the entire time
horizon of our model. We do not take into account the capacity coming from hydro units with
possibility of storage (peaking power plants) because of the additional capacity and storage
constraints which would increase the complexity of the model.
1Let us recall that price taking firms guarantee that when firms maximize their profits (by choosing the
quantity they wish to produce and the technology of generation to produce it with) the market price will be
equal to marginal cost.
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62.2 Modelling the time horizon
The time horizon of the model is T= 36 months2 beginning by the month of January. We
choose a time horizon of 36 months for our modelling because we need a sufficiently long time
horizon to follow up the evolution of the optimal production and storage fuel levels as well as
the variations of price and profit. A French nuclear producer has two main options with respect
to the scheduling of fuel reloading: (i) 1/3 of fuel reservoir that corresponds to 18 months of
campaign3 and 396 days equivalent to full capacity for a unit of 1300 MW, (ii) 1/4 of fuel
reservoir that corresponds to 12 months of campaign and 258 days equivalent to full capacity
for a unit of 1500 MW (Source: EDF, CEA, see Ref. [18]). Note that both options result
from the operational schema of EDF (Electricite´ de France). The scheduling of fuel reloading
is entirely exogenous within our model because the regular length of a campaign depends on
many factors (technical specificities of the reactor, size, age, management decision to reload
the reactor’s heart per third or quarter of its full capacity, type of nuclear fuel put into the
fuel bars, forecasted average rate of use of the reactor, regulatory constraints issued by safety
inspectors...) which are difficult to control in order to determine endogenously the duration
of the campaign within our model. In view of the exogenous scheduling of the fuel reloading
(per third, per quarter of fuel reservoir), we consider that the quantity of the fuel reloaded in
the reservoir is also exogenous and is decided exclusively by EDF. In order to get a tractable
model, we need a cyclic model for the modelling of the campaign. We exclude the case of
having both a campaign of 12 and of 18 months to avoid complicate our model. We do not
retain the first modelling, hence a campaign of 18 months because it is not consistent with the
“good” seasonal allocation of shutdowns of the nuclear plants. Indeed, if a nuclear operator
reloads fuel in summer when the demand is low the date of the next reloading will be then
in winter when the demand is high. Consequently, we retain a modelling close to the second
modelling, thus a duration of campaign equivalent to 12 months to get a cyclic model with a
periodicity of one year. The one year period can be then decomposed into 11 months being
the period of production and 1 month corresponding to the month of reloading of the fuel.
We also assume that the value of profit is not discounted during the period of 36 months; the
discounting rate would have an important impact on the value of profit in the case of a longer
time horizon (e.g. 84 months). We do not deal with the question of the optimal allocation of
the shutdowns in this thesis for several reasons: (i) lack of operational data for confidentiality
reasons, (ii) for operational reasons and because of the intervention of many qualified persons
external to the nuclear producer for the reloading of a reactor, the length of the campaign is
determined in advance in order to get a general scheduling of reloading, (iii) lack of information
with regard to the periodical inspections of nuclear reactors and the inspections imposed by
the Nuclear Safety Authority. Hence, we assume that the refueling dates are exogenous given
via a programming realized by EDF (model ORION) which determines the optimal allocation
of the shutdowns of nuclear units for reloading.
2.3 Modelling the generating units
We study a competitive electricity market with N ! 2 producers who manage both nuclear and
non-nuclear thermal generation resources. We define 12 different types of nuclear generating
units. A producer n = 1, · · · , N operates with all types of nuclear generating units. It holds
2The time horizon of the model is a multiplicative of twelve, being expressed in months. Therefore it could
be modified.
3The length of a campaign (of production) is determined by the maximum number of days during which a
nuclear unit produces until exhaustion of its fuel of reloading.
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7a certain level of capacity from each type of nuclear unit. The nuclear units also have their
own single cost function. However, we assume that these units differ by the available nuclear
capacity that each of them holds as by the month of their fuel reloading. We can then define our
twelve “types” of nuclear units. Each type indexed by j = 1, · · · , 12 corresponds to a different
month of reloading of the nuclear unit. Then, a unit which belongs to the type of unit j = 1
(respectively j = 2, · · · , j = 12) shuts down in the month of January (respectively February,
· · · , December).
The level of the nuclear production during the month t = 1, · · · , T for the unit j of producer
n will be denoted by qnucnjt . Moreover, the maximum nuclear production that can be realized by
the unit j of producer n during a month is given by the parameter Qn,j,nucmax , while the minimum
nuclear production is equal to Qn,j,nucmin .
Symmetrically, each producer disposes a certain amount of non-nuclear thermal capacity.
The level of the non-nuclear thermal production during the month t = 1, · · · , T for the producer
n will be denoted by qthnt. Furthermore the maximum non-nuclear thermal production during
a month for the producer n is given by the parameter Qn,thmax and corresponds to the nominal
non-nuclear thermal capacity, while there is no minimum for non-nuclear thermal production
Qn,thmin = 0.
The cost functions of both nuclear and non-nuclear thermal production are common among
the different producers.
2.4 Modelling the production costs
The nuclear cost function is made of a fixed part determined by the cost of investment, the
fixed cost of exploitation and taxes and a variable part which corresponds to the variable cost
of exploitation and the fuel cost. We assume that the cost function4 Cnucn,j (.) of the nuclear
production is affine and defined as
Cnucn,j (q
nuc
njt ) = a
n,j
nuc + bnucq
nuc
njt .
The non-nuclear thermal cost function is also made of a fixed part which corresponds to
the cost of investment, the fixed cost of exploitation and taxes and a variable part covering the
variable cost of exploitation, the fuel cost, the cost of CO2 as well as the taxes on the gas fuel.
We assume that the non-nuclear production has a quadratic cost function Cthn (.) which is the
following
Cthn (q
th
nt) = a
n
th + bthq
th
nt + c
n
thq
th
nt
2
.
Proposition 2.1 The fixed part anth of the non-nuclear thermal cost function is proportional to
the capacity Qn,thmax while the coefficients bth, c
n
th of the variable part of the non-nuclear thermal
cost function are such that : (i) bth does not depend on the capacity Qn,thmax, (ii) c
n
th is inversely
proportional to the capacity Qn,thmax.
Proof
In order to understand this dependency of the coefficients anth, bth, c
n
th, let us consider a
particular case. Let us assume that the non-nuclear thermal capacity of producer 2 is twice
the non-nuclear thermal capacity of producer 1 : Q2,thmax = 2Q
1,th
max. Therefore, producer 2 can be
seen as the aggregation of the identical copies of producer 1. Then, the “total” cost Cth2 (q
th
2t ) of
4The coefficient an,jnuc is proportional to the capacity Qn,j,nucmax since it corresponds to the fixed part of the
nuclear cost function.
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.74
8production (obtained by the capacity Q2,thmax) is equal to the minimum of the sum of “individual”
costs. More precisely, we have
Cth2 (q
th
2t ) = min
qth1t ,q
th
1t
(Cth1 (q
th
1t ) + C
th
1 (q
th
1t))
subject to the constraints
0 " qth1t " Q1,thmax, for all t
0 " qth1t " Q1,thmax, for all t
qth1t + q
th
1t = q
th
2t , for all t
The resolution of this convex (and polynomial) optimization problem is very simple and the
solution is symmetric : qth1t = q
th
1t =
qth2t
2 . Hence, the cost function will be
Cth2 (q
th
2t ) = 2a
1
th + bthq
th
2t +
c1th
2
qth2t
2
.
Consequently, we conclude that when the capacity doubles, the coefficient a1th is multiplied
by two, the coefficient bth is unchanged and the coefficient c1th is divided by two.
We showed the dependency of the coefficients of the non-nuclear thermal cost Cthn from the
capacity Qn,thmax in the particular case that Q
2,th
max = νQ
1,th
max, where ν ∈ N∗. Symmetrically, this
dependency is also verified in the case that Q2,thmax =
1
νQ
1,th
max. Thus, one deduces that a similar
result is obtained when5 ν ∈ Q∗+ (we remind that a positive rational number is expressed as
a fraction ab , where a, b ∈ N∗). However, the set of rational numbers Q is dense in R which
means that all real numbers can be approximated by rational numbers (see Ref. [25]). Hence,
this dependency still holds in the general case that6 ν ∈ R∗+.
#
The nuclear and non-nuclear cost functions are monotone increasing and convex functions
of qnucnjt and q
th
nt respectively. As we explained in our previous paper, we choose a quadratic
cost function in the case of non-nuclear thermal because of the increasing marginal cost of the
non-nuclear thermal production since it results from different fossil fuel generation technologies
(e.g. coal, gas -combined cycle or not-, fuel oil). Moreover, the non-nuclear production needed
a non constant marginal cost function in order to recover its fixed costs. Indeed, if we assume
a constant marginal cost function for non-nuclear thermal then the value of the non-nuclear
thermal production when non-nuclear is the marginal technology does not permit to recover its
fixed costs. So, we assume that the marginal cost of nuclear mcnuc(qnucnjt ) is a constant function
of qnucnjt while that of non-nuclear thermal mc
th
n (q
th
nt) is an increasing function of q
th
nt.
2.5 Modelling the nuclear fuel stock
Let us denote Sn,jreload, the nuclear fuel stock of reloading available to the unit j of producer
n. The variable Sn,jt ! 0, which represents the quantity of fuel stored in the nuclear reservoir
and available to the unit j of producer n at the beginning of the month t, is the potential
energy that can be produced with this stock. The evolution of the nuclear fuel stock is then
determined by the following rules
5The set of positive rational numbers is usually denoted as Q∗+.
6The set of positive real numbers is usually denoted as R∗+.
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9Sn,j1 given, S
n,j
t+1 =
{
Sn,jt − qnucnjt , if no reload during month t for unit j
Sn,jreload, if unit j reloads during month t
(1)
The relationship (1) traces the evolution of the stock given the flow of the nuclear production.
In the case that t is the month during which the producer reloads the fuel of the reactor, the
stock at the beginning of the following month (beginning of the campaign) is equal to Sn,jreload.
Moreover, we impose
Sn,jT+1 ! Sn,j1 (2)
The constraint (2) implies that the producer n must keep his nuclear units at the end of the
game in the same storage condition as the initial one. It means that each nuclear producer has
to finish the period T at least with the same quantity of nuclear fuel as the initial one. In this
way each producer has to “spare” its nuclear fuel during the production period. The absence
of this constraint could lead to an “over-consumption” of the nuclear fuel stock in order to
produce the maximum; this could generate some negative effects (e.g. insufficient level of stock
to reach at least the minimum nuclear production level during some months (excluding the
month of reloading)). Furthermore, the constraint (2) guarantees that the producer will start
a new cycle of this game with a quantity of stock equal to Sn,j1 at the beginning of the game.
Let us notice that the producer n spends all its nuclear fuel stock of reloading Sn,jreload during
a campaign (11 months), thus it disposes a quantity of nuclear fuel stock equal to zero at the
end of the campaign (beginning of the month of reloading). Several reasons lead us to this
ascertainment:
• The technical aspect related with the way that the length of a campaign of nuclear units
is determined (cf. Footnote 3, page 6).
• The evaluation of the variable part (bnuc) of the nuclear cost function which partially
corresponds to the fuel cost is based on the fact that a producer uses all the available
nuclear fuel stock: if a nuclear producer keeps paying in order to obtain the fuel stock
Sn,jreload even in the case that it does not consomme all the stock during a campaign,
then this cost can be regarded as a fixed cost which is paid at the beginning of each
campaign. Consequently, the fuel cost should be integrated into the fixed part of the
nuclear cost function, which means that the coefficient an,jnuc and thus the nuclear cost
would be modified.
• The cost that a nuclear producer undergoes to get rid of the unused nuclear fuel at the
end of the campaigns (cost related to the reprocessing of nuclear fuel).
For the same reasons, the constraint (2) can not hold as inequality constraint (Sn,jT+1 > S
n,j
1 )
which means that the surplus of stock at the end of the game is zero. Note that there exists
an obvious analogy with Walras’ Law. Consequently, the constraint (2) will take the form
Sn,jT+1 = S
n,j
1 (3)
We proceed now with Proposition 2.2 in order to define the nuclear fuel constraints for the
unit j of producer n.
Proposition 2.2 If the evolution of the stock is determined by the relationship (1) and the
constraint (3) is imposed, then the nuclear fuel constraints for the nuclear unit j of producer n
are defined as following :
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
∑12
t=2 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload, so that unit 1 uses stock reloaded during month 1∑24
t=14 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload, so that unit 1 uses stock reloaded during month 13∑T
t=26 q
nuc
n1t = S
n,1
reload, so that unit 1 uses stock reloaded during month 25
(4)

∑j−1
t=1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
1 , so that unit j uses stock available in month 1∑j+12−1
t=j+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload, so that unit j uses stock reloaded during month j∑j+2∗12−1
t=j+12+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload, so that unit j uses stock reloaded during month
j + 12∑T
t=j+2∗12+1 q
nuc
njt = S
n,j
reload − Sn,j1 , so that unit j uses stock reloaded during month
j + 24 until the end of the game
(5)

∑11
t=1 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload, so that unit 12 uses stock of reloading from month 1∑23
t=13 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload, so that unit 12 uses stock reloaded during month 12∑T−1
t=25 q
nuc
n12t = S
n,12
reload, so that unit 12 uses stock reloaded during month 24
(6)
Proof
• j=1
Let us start our proof by the simplest case: the nuclear units of type j = 1. They reload
their nuclear fuel in the month of January. The producer n finishes the campaigns with a
quantity of stock equal to zero.
Then, from the relationship (1), we have that
0 = Sn,113 = S
n,1
12 − qnucn,1,12 = · · · = Sn,12 −
12∑
t=2
qnucn,1,t = S
n,1
reload −
12∑
t=2
qnucn,1,t ⇔
12∑
t=2
qnucn1t = S
n,1
reload
Thus, the nuclear production realized by the unit 1 of producer n during its first campaign
is equal to the nuclear fuel stock of reloading that is available to the unit 1 at the beginning of
the campaign.
Symmetrically, the nuclear production realized by the unit 1 of producer n during its second
respectively third campaign is determined by the following constraints
0 = Sn,125 = S
n,1
24 − qnucn,1,24 = · · · = Sn,114 −
24∑
t=14
qnucn1t = S
n,1
reload −
24∑
t=14
qnucn1t ⇔
24∑
t=14
qnucn,1,t = S
n,1
reload
respectively
0 = Sn,11 = S
n,1
36 − qnucn,1,36 = · · · = Sn,126 −
36∑
t=26
qnucn1t = S
n,1
reload −
36∑
t=26
qnucn1t ⇔
36∑
t=26
qnucn,1,t = S
n,1
reload.
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.74
11
• j=2
We continue our proof with the nuclear units of type 2. They reload their nuclear fuel in
the month of February.
According to the relationship (1), given the quantity of nuclear fuel available to the unit
2 of producer n at the beginning of the time horizon of the model, Sn,21 ! 0, the nuclear fuel
constraints are determined as following
0 = Sn,22 = S
n,2
1 − qnucn,2,1 ⇔ qnucn,2,1 = Sn,21
0 = Sn,214 = S
n,2
13 − qnucn,2,13 = · · · = Sn,23 −
13∑
t=3
qnucn,2,t = S
n,2
reload −
13∑
t=3
qnucn,2,t ⇔
13∑
t=3
qnucn,2,t = S
n,2
reload
0 = Sn,226 = S
n,2
25 − qnucn,2,25 = · · · = Sn,215 −
25∑
t=15
qnucn,2,t = S
n,2
reload −
25∑
t=15
qnucn,2,t ⇔
25∑
t=15
qnucn,2,t = S
n,2
reload
Sn,2T+1 = S
n,2
T −qnucn,2,T = · · · = Sn,227 −
T∑
t=27
qnucn,2,t = S
n,2
reload−
T∑
t=27
qnucn,2,t = S
n,2
1 ⇔
T∑
t=27
qnucn,2,t = S
n,2
reload−Sn,21
The last constraint results from the evolution of the stock and from the obligation of pro-
ducer n to keep its nuclear units at the end of the period T in the same storage condition as
the initial one (constraint (3)).
• j ∈ {3, · · · , 11}
The nuclear units of type {3, · · · , 11} reload their fuel in the month of {March, · · · ,
November}. The proof applied in this case is symmetrical with the one provided for the nuclear
units of type 2.
• j=12
Finally, we finish our proof with the nuclear units of type 12. They reload their nuclear fuel
in the month of December. The producer n finishes the campaigns with a quantity of stock
equal to zero. The proof is similar to the one given for the nuclear units of type 1.
#
Later, the length of a campaign will also correspond to the maximum number of days that
a nuclear unit produces until the “available to the unit” nuclear fuel stock is exhausted.
2.6 The modelling of the optimal inter-temporal production be-
haviour
The optimal inter-temporal production problem that producer n resolves is the following:
max
((qnucnjt )
J
j=1,(q
th
nt))
T
t=1
T∑
t=1
(pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucnjt + q
th
nt)−
J∑
j=1
Cnucnj (q
nuc
njt )− Cthn (qthnt)) (7)
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subject to the nuclear fuel storage constraints (4), (5), (6) as well as{
Qn,j,nucmin " qnucnjt " Qn,j,nucmax , if no reload during month t for unit j
qnucnjt = 0, if unit j reloads during month t
(8)
0 " qthnt " Qn,thmax, for all t (9)
where J is the total number of units (J = 12) and the price pt is given (perfect competition)
by the equality between supply and demand.
The constraint (8) shows that the nuclear production of each month is bound by the mini-
mum/maximum quantity of nuclear production which can be obtained during a month. The
non-nuclear thermal production is a non negative quantity which is also bound by the maximum
non-nuclear thermal production (constraint (9)). The producer can use the non-nuclear thermal
resources to produce electricity until it reaches the level of demand of the corresponding month
without however violating the constraint (9).
3 Symmetry of equilibrium of the optimal inter-temporal
production problem
In this section, we provide an economical property of producer’s optimal behaviour. Under
the assumption that each producer disposes the same level of nuclear and non-nuclear thermal
capacity, we show that an equilibrium of the inter-temporal profit maximization problem (7) is
“almost” symmetric.
3.1 The notion of equilibrium
Let us give a definition of equilibrium with respect to a system of prices p ∈ RT
Definition 3.1 The production vector (((qnuc1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t)
T
t=1, · · · , ((qnucNjt)Jj=1, qthNt)Tt=1) is an equili-
brium with respect to a system of prices p ∈ RT if:
(i) it maximizes the profit of producer n on the set of feasible solutions, for all n.
(ii) at each date t, it respects the equality between supply and demand.
According to the subsection 2.1, the monthly demand which is considered in this model
results from the difference between the level of demand Dt observed in month t and the aggregate
hydro production QhydTot,t provided during the month t. At each date t, the equality between
supply and demand is defined as
N∑
n=1
(
J∑
j=1
qnucnjt + q
th
nt) = Dt −QhydTot,t. (10)
3.2 The notion of symmetrisability
In view of the assumption of symmetry of the nuclear and non-nuclear thermal capacity
among producers, the exogenous variables (Qn,j,nucmax , Q
n,j,nuc
min , Q
n,th
max, S
n,j
reload, S
n,j
1 ) of the optimiza-
tion problem (7) as well as the production cost functions (Cnucn,j , C
th
n ) and thus, the marginal
non-nuclear thermal cost function (mcthn ) no longer depend on n. If (((q
nuc
1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t )
T
t=1, · · · ,
((qnucNjt)
J
j=1, q
th
Nt)
T
t=1) is an equilibrium of this problem, we show that the non-nuclear thermal
component of the equilibrium is symmetric while the nuclear component of the equilibrium is
symmetrisable. Let us define the notion of a symmetrisable equilibrium as following:
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Definition 3.2 Let (q1, q2, · · · , qN) be an equilibrium. This equilibrium is called symmetrisable
if there exists a symmetric allocation (q˜1, q˜2, · · · , q˜N), which is an equilibrium and “leads” to
the same prices as the initial allocation (qn)Nn=1.
Notice that the notion of symmetrisability of an equilibrium provides us with an interesting
economical feature: the profit of a symmetrisable equilibrium (pi1, pi2, · · · , piN) is symmetric.
This means that the production levels included in a symmetrisable equilibrium are equivalently
profitable for all producers. This arises from the fact that the profit resulting from a symmetri-
sable equilibrium is equal to the profit which results from the deduced symmetric equilibrium
since the price induced by the symmetrisable equilibrium is equal to the price induced by the
symmetric equilibrium. For a symmetric equilibrium, the value of profit is equal among the
different producers at the equilibrium state, since the price pt as well as the production level
are identical for all players and the production cost is symmetric for both technologies.
3.3 Symmetry of the non-nuclear thermal component and symmetri-
sability of the nuclear component of equilibrium
Before we proceed with Proposition 3.1, let us provide a useful remark:
Remark 3.1 The optimal inter-temporal production problem (7) is additively separable with
respect to the couple (qnucnjt , q
th
nt) (see Ref. [30]). This results from the fact that the inter-temporal
profit function is an additively separable function since it can be written as the sum of the
inter-temporal profit resulting from the nuclear production and the inter-temporal profit co-
ming from the non-nuclear thermal production and because there is no constraints linking the
production variables (qnucnjt ) and (q
th
nt). Consequently, the two inter-temporal profit maximization
problems (nuclear and non-nuclear thermal) can be studied independently. First, let us study the
non-nuclear thermal inter-temporal profit maximization problem of producer n. By the same
argument, it is additively separable with respect to the time index t since the inter-temporal
profit is additively separable with respect to t and the minimum and maximum non-nuclear
thermal production constraints are mutually “independent” on t. Then, we look at the nuclear
inter-temporal profit maximization problem of producer n. It is additively separable with respect
to the unit index j because the profit is additively separable with respect to j and the nuclear
production constraints are mutually “independent” on j. However, this is not the case for the
time index t because the nuclear production constraints and more precisely, the nuclear fuel
constraints link the nuclear production variables (qnucnjt ) on t (inside a campaign). Hence, the
nuclear optimal production problem of producer n is not separable with respect to t.
We are ready now to state the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Let be (((qnuc1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t )
T
t=1, · · · , ((qnucNjt)Jj=1, qthNt)Tt=1) an equilibrium of the opti-
mal inter-temporal production problem (7). If the nuclear and the non-nuclear thermal capacity
are symmetric among producers then the non-nuclear thermal component of the equilibrium is
symmetric while the nuclear component of the equilibrium is symmetrisable.
Proof
First, we show that the non-nuclear thermal component of the equilibrium (qth1t , q
th
2t , · · · , qthNt)
is symmetric. In view of the Remark 3.3.1, it follows that, for all t, the non-nuclear thermal
production qthnt is a solution of
max
ψthnt
ptψ
th
nt − Cth(ψthnt)
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subject to the constraint
0 " ψthnt " Qthmax, for all t
where n ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
We want to show that qth1t = q
th
2t = · · · = qthNt. One has qth1t (respectively qth2t , · · · , qthNt) a
solution of
max
ψth1t
ptψ
th
1t − Cth(ψth1t ) (11)
subject to the constraint
0 " ψth1t " Qthmax
In view of the strict concavity of the cost function Cth, the problem (11) has a unique solu-
tion. Since qth1t , q
th
2t , · · · , qthNt are all solutions of problem (11), they are equal and the symmetry
is proved.
Remark 3.2 Note that when the non-nuclear thermal production is positive, the price is de-
termined by the marginal cost of the non-nuclear thermal production (pt = mcth(qtht )).
Let us now focus on the nuclear component of the equilibrium. We prove that the nuclear
component of the equilibrium (qnuc1jt , q
nuc
2jt , · · · , qnucNjt) is symmetrisable. By analogy with the case
of the non-nuclear thermal technology, for all j, the nuclear production qnucnjt of producer n is a
solution of
max
ψnucnjt
T∑
t=1
(ptψ
nuc
njt − Cnucj (ψnucnjt )) (12)
subject to the nuclear fuel storage constraints and the minimum/maximum nuclear production
constraints.
The constraints of the reduced optimization problem (12) determine its domain of definition.
It is clear that it is a convex set, since it is defined by affine constraints. In addition, the
objective function of the reduced profit maximization problem (12) is affine. Thus, it is a
concave function. In view of the convexity of the domain of definition and the concavity of the
objective function of the problem (12), we conclude that the set of solutions of the optimization
problem (12) is convex (see Ref. [20]). Therefore, the allocation (q˜nuc1jt , q˜
nuc
2jt , · · · , q˜nucNjt), where
(q˜nuc1jt = q˜
nuc
2jt = · · · = q˜nucNjt =
∑N
n=1
qnucnjt
N for all j, t) is also a solution of this problem. In
addition, at each date t, it respects the equality between supply and demand. Consequently,
the symmetric allocation (q˜nuc1jt , q˜
nuc
2jt , · · · , q˜nucNjt) is an equilibrium. In order to show that it “leads”
to the same price as the initial equilibrium (qnuc1jt , q
nuc
2jt , · · · , qnucNjt), we proceed with Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1 The price induced by (((qnuc1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t ), · · · , ((qnucNjt)Jj=1, qthNt)) is equal to the price
induced by (((q˜nuc1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t ), · · · , ((q˜nucNjt)Jj=1, qthNt)) for all t.
Proof
Let be P n = {t ∈ {1, · · · , T} s.t. qthnt = 0} for each n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. Note that in view of
the first part of the proof, the set P n does not depend on n. If t /∈ P , there is nothing to prove
since the price is determined by the marginal cost of non-nuclear thermal marginal production
which is unchanged. If t ∈ P , in both cases, the price pt is determined by the marginal cost of
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the nuclear production which is constant (pt = mcnuc(qnucnjt ) = bnuc for all t ∈ P ). Consequently,
it is obvious that both prices are equal for all t.
#
Hence, in view of Lemma 3.1, the equilibrium (q˜nuc1jt , q˜
nuc
2jt , · · · , q˜nucNjt) “leads” to the same price
as the initial one. So, according to the Definition 3.2, the nuclear component of the equilibrium
(qnuc1jt , q
nuc
2jt , · · · , qnucNjt) is symmetrisable.
We conclude that the equilibrium (((qnuc1jt )
J
j=1, q
th
1t )
T
t=1, · · · , ((qnucNjt)Jj=1, qthNt)Tt=1) is characterized
by a symmetric non-nuclear thermal component and a symmetrisable nuclear component.
#
It should be noticed that the nuclear component of the equilibrium (qnuc1jt , q
nuc
2jt , · · · , qnucNjt) is
potentially asymmetric. In order to understand this asymmetry, let us give an example in the
case of two producers (N = 2). Let (q̂nuc1jt , q̂
nuc
2jt ) be a symmetric equilibrium such that the price
is the same during the period 1 and the period 2 (i.e. p1 = p2). This occurs in particular, if
nuclear is the marginal technology in periods 1 and 2. Then, any feasible production realized
by the unit 3 of producer 1 (respectively 2) in periods 1, 2 that means a solution of the following
system:

q131 + q231 = q̂131 + q̂231 = D1 - Q
hyd
Tot,1, supply - demand equilibrium constraint
in month 1
q132 + q232 = q̂132 + q̂232 = D2 - Q
hyd
Tot,2, supply - demand equilibrium constraint
in month 2
q131 + q132 = q̂131 + q̂132 = S31 , nuclear fuel constraint for unit 3 of producer 1
q231 + q232 = q̂231 + q̂232 = S31 , nuclear fuel constraint for unit 3 of producer 2
and unchanged during the remaining periods (qnucnjt = q̂
nuc
njt , for all n ∈ {1, 2}, for all j %= 3,
and for t ! 3) will be still an equilibrium. Consequently, there exists at least one asymmetric
equilibrium of the optimal production problem (12), where for example unit 3 produces more
for producer 1 than for producer 2 in period 1 (and the opposite in period 2 in order to
compensate).
In view of Proposition 3.1, we will only focus on the symmetric solution, thus it does not
depend on n any longer. This leads to a decrease of the number of the optimization variables
of the optimal inter-temporal production problem (7) which simplifies its resolution.
4 Optimization of the inter-temporal production
In this section, we study the optimization of the inter-temporal production. First, we show
that under some assumptions the inter-temporal profit decreases for all the production vectors
with zero non-nuclear thermal production. Therefore, we search for a solution of the optimal
inter-temporal production problem (7) among the feasible solutions which are determined by
strictly positive non-nuclear thermal production levels. Then, we continue our study with the
proof of a property that characterizes the “ interior” optimal solutions of problem (7). We also
prove for a production vector with strictly positive non-nuclear thermal production levels that
if it has this property then it constitutes a solution of the inter-temporal optimal production
problem (7).
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4.1 Producers’ inter-temporal profit decrease in the absence of non-
nuclear thermal production
We define the set of feasible solutions of the optimal production problem (7) as
C =
{
q ∈M s.t. Q
j,nuc
min " qnucjt " Qj,nucmax , for all j, t
0 " qtht " Qthmax, for all t
}
where M is defined by all the production vectors of the form q = ((qnucj1 )
J
j=1, · · · , (qnucjT )Jj=1,
qth1 , · · · , qthT ) that respect the nuclear fuel constraints ((4), (5), (6)) as well as the supply-demand
equilibrium constraint (10) for all t. The set M is affine and the set C is compact and convex.
Moreover, we define F as the relative interior7 of C (F = ri(C)). It has the following form
F =
{
q ∈M s.t. Q
j,nuc
min < q
nuc
jt < Q
j,nuc
max , for all j, t
0 < qtht < Q
j,th
max, for all t
}
Let us focus on the set F th defined as
F th =
{
q ∈M s.t. Q
j,nuc
min " qnucjt " Qj,nucmax , for all j, t
0 < qtht " Qthmax, for all t
}
Remark 4.1 F th is containing F and is contained in C and C is contained in M (F ⊂ F th ⊂
C ⊂M).
Since the marginal technology is the non-nuclear thermal on F th, the price is determined
by the non-nuclear thermal production. We now proceed with Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1 If F th is a non-empty set, then F th = C.
Proof
First, we show that F th ⊂ C. Since F th is contained to C (see Remark 3.4.1) and C is a
compact set, we have that
F th ⊂ C ⇒ F th ⊂ C = C.
Secondly, we prove that F th ⊃ C. Let q1 ∈ C and q0 ∈ F th. For all m ∈ N, there
exists a sequence zm = (1 − 1m + 1)q1 + 1m + 1q0 belonging to F th such that limm→∞ zm =
limm→∞(1− 1m + 1)q1 + 1m + 1q0 = q1. Hence, q1 ∈ F th and the inclusion is proved.
From the first and the second part of the proof, we conclude that F th = C.
#
Note that in section 6.2, we show that F is a non-empty set for our numerical data, thus
the assumption of Proposition 4.1 is satisfied.
From a geometrical point of view one deduces from Proposition 4.1 that all the points of
the set C and thus those which belong to C \ F th can be approached by points that belong
to F th. This result is fundamental in order to show in the next proposition the discontinuity
and more specifically the decrease of the inter-temporal profit on these particular points which
results from a decrease of the price (see Ref. [31]).
Proposition 4.2 If bnuc < bth and q ∈ C \ F th, there exists a sequence (qr)r∈N ∈ F th with
limr→∞ qr = q such that limr→∞ pi(qr) > pi(q).
7It is important to emphasize that the usual interior of C is empty since M is an affine set that is not equal
to Rn. Consequently, we focus on a generalization called relative interior (see Ref. [21], Ref. [30]).
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Proof
According to the assumptions, q is a production vector which belongs to C \ F th ⊂ C. It
follows that the set S = {t ∈ {1, · · · , T} s.t. qtht = 0} is a non-empty set. Let us denote
q = ((qnucj1 , · · · , qnucjT )Jj=1, qth1 , · · · , qthT ).
Profit’s function pi : C → R is defined as
pi(q) =
T∑
t=1
(pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )−
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt )− Cth(qtht ))
In view of Proposition 4.1, the production vector q ∈ F th. It follows that there exists a
sequence (qr)r∈N such that qr ∈ F th and limr→∞ qr = q. Let us denote qr = ((qnucj1r , · · · , qnucjTr)Jj=1,
qth1r, · · · , qthTr). For all r, we can compute the associated merit order price pr = (p1r, · · · , pTr) =
(mcth(qth1r), · · · ,mcth(qthTr)). The price vector p = (p1, · · · , · · · , pT ) represents the merit order
price associated with the production vector q. Since at the limit, the value of qr is equal to q,
we deduce that the nuclear is the marginal technology during the period t of the game, for all
t ∈ S. Thus, the price vector p is such that the price pt in period t ∈ S is determined by the
nuclear marginal cost bnuc. For all t ∈ S, it follows that
lim
r→∞
ptr = lim
r→∞
mcth(qthtr ) = mc
th(qtht ) = mc
th(0) = bth > bnuc = pt. (13)
For all t /∈ S, the non-nuclear thermal production is strictly positive, thus the price pt is
determined by the non-nuclear thermal marginal cost (pt = mc
th(qtht )). So, we have
lim
r→∞
ptr = lim
r→∞
mcth(qthtr ) = mc
th(qtht ) = pt. (14)
At the limit, we obtain
lim
r→∞
pi(qr)− pi(q) =
∑
t/∈S
lim
r→∞
(ptr(
J∑
j=1
qnucjtr + q
th
tr )− pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t ))+
∑
t∈S
lim
r→∞
(ptr(
J∑
j=1
qnucjtr + q
th
tr )− pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t ))+
T∑
t=1
lim
r→∞
((
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jtr )− Cth(qthtr ))− (
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt )− Cth(qtht )))
Since limr→∞ qr = q and the price is continuous on the set T \ S (see relationship (14)) the
first term converges to zero. However, in view of the non-emptiness of S, of the relationship
(13) and of the strictly positive nuclear production (
∑J
j=1 q
nuc
jt !
∑J
j=1 Q
j,nuc
min > 0) the second
term is strictly positive. Finally, the third term converges to zero because of the continuity of
the production cost functions.
Consequently, we deduce that limr→∞ pi(qr) − pi(q) > 0 ⇔ limr→∞ pi(qr) > pi(q) and the
proposition is proved.
#
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Corollary 4.1 The inter-temporal profit maximization problem determined on C is equivalent
to the inter-temporal profit maximization problem determined on F th (same set of solutions and
same value8).
Proof
This corollary is an obvious consequence of Proposition 4.2.
#
It should be noticed that if the inter-temporal profit maximization problem is determined
on C which is a compact set, the objective function is not continuous in view of Proposition
4.2. If the inter-temporal profit maximization problem is determined on F th, the objective
function is continuous according to Proposition 4.2 while F th is not a compact set. Thus, it is
not possible to conclude on the existence of solutions of this problem.
4.2 A property when the optimal solution is “interior”.
In view of our data, bnuc < bth holds, hence according to Proposition 4.2, the inter-temporal
profit of a producer decreases for all productions vectors that belong to the subset C \ F th of
C. This leads a producer to search for a solution that maximizes the inter-temporal profit on
F th. The next proposition gives a property when in addition the solution belongs to the set F .
Proposition 4.3 If there exists an equilibrium ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1 ∈ F such that the inter-
temporal profit of a producer is maximum on C and (qnuct )
T
t=1 is the corresponding monthly
nuclear production vector then qnuc1 = q
nuc
2 = · · · = qnucT .
Proof
In order to determine a global solution of the inter-temporal profit maximization problem on
C, we choose to apply the Karush - Kuhn - Tucker (KKT) conditions (see Ref. [20]). However,
KKT conditions can not be applied because the objective function (profit function) is not
continuous within this set (see Proposition 4.2). In view of Corollary 4.1, q = ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1
solves the following optimal inter-temporal production problem
max
((qnucjt )
J
j=1,q
th
t )
T
t=1∈F th
T∑
t=1
(pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )−
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt )− Cth(qtht )) (15)
The objective function being continuous within F th permits the application of KKT condi-
tions in order to determine q = ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1. Since M is an affine set, Slater’s condition is
satisfied (see Ref. [28], Ref. [29]). Therefore, there exists (µt)Tt=1 ∈ RT and (λkj )Jj=1 ∈ R(J−2)4+6
such that the KKT conditions are met, where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
supply-demand equilibrium constraint at each month t and λkj is the Lagrange multiplier for
the nuclear fuel constraint of the unit j during the campaign k which is defined as{
k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, for j ∈ {1, 12}
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, for j ∈ {2, · · · , 11}
In view of KKT conditions of complementarity and since q ∈ F , all the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the min/max production constraints are equal to zero and they will be omitted
in the Lagrangien function of this problem.
Let us call L the reduced Lagrangien of the optimal production problem (15)
8The value of an optimization problem is defined as the upper bound of the set {f(x)|x ∈ C}, where f is
the objective function and C is the set of feasible solutions. The value always exists (in the extended real line)
even if the set of solutions is empty.
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L(q) = pi − σ · (Dq − E)
where pi is the inter-temporal profit of a producer, σ = (λkj , µt) is the vector of the Lagrange
multipliers, q = ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1 is a production vector of F
th, E = (Ej)Jj=1 is the vector that
contains the nuclear fuel stock of the unit j during a campaign and D is the matrix so that the
set M defined in subsection 4.1 is equal to {q′ s.t. Dq′ − E = 0}.
The inter-temporal profit pi of a producer is
T∑
t=1
(pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )−
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt )− Cth(qtht ))
We remind that the price pt is given by the marginal cost of the non-nuclear thermal production
on the set F th. Following some calculations and by using the supply-demand equilibrium
constraints, we deduce that producer’s inter-temporal profit is a quadratic function of the
non-nuclear thermal production qtht
−cth
T∑
t=1
(qtht )
2 + 2cth
T∑
t=1
(Dt −QhydTot,t)qtht + c (16)
where c = (−∑Tt=1 ath −∑Tt=1∑Jj=1 ajnuc + (bth − bnuc)Sreload) is the constant part of the profit
function. The quantity Sreload denotes the total nuclear fuel stock of reloading that is available
over the entire time horizon T , hence
∑T
t=1
∑J
j=1 q
nuc
jt = Sreload.
According to the KKT conditions, one has
∂L
∂qnucjt
(q) = 0, for all j, t
and
∂L
∂qtht
(q) = 0, for all t.
The derivative of Lagrangien with respect to the thermal production qth1 at month 1 is
∂L
∂qth1
(q) = 2cth(D1 −QhydTot,1)− 2cthqth1 − µ1 = 0⇔ (D1 −QhydTot,1)− qth1 =
µ1
2cth
(17)
By a symmetric argument, the derivative of Lagrangien with respect to the thermal production
qth2 at month 2 is
∂L
∂qth2
(q) = 2cth(D2 −QhydTot,2)− 2cthqth2 − µ2 = 0⇔ (D2 −QhydTot,2)− qth2 =
µ2
2cth
(18)
In order to compare µ1 and µ2, let us focus on a unit which is active in both month 1 and 2.
The derivative of Lagrangien with respect to the nuclear production qnuc31 of unit 3 at month 1
is
∂L
∂qnuc31
(q) = −µ1 − λ13 = 0⇔ µ1 = −λ13 (19)
The derivative of Lagrangien with respect to the nuclear production qnuc32 of unit 3 at month 2
is
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∂L
∂qnuc32
(q) = −µ2 − λ13 = 0⇔ µ2 = −λ13 (20)
From the last two equations, we deduce that µ1 = µ2. In view of the equality between supply
and demand, this means that
(D1 −QhydTot,1)− qth1 = (D2 −QhydTot,2)− qth2 ⇔ qnuc1 = qnuc2
By using a unit available at month t and t + 1, we obtain µt = µt+1, which implies that
qnuct = q
nuc
t+1. Consequently,
qnuc1 = q
nuc
2 = · · · = qnucT .
We conclude that an equilibrium of the optimal production problem (15) is characterized by
a constant monthly nuclear production and a variable non-nuclear thermal production which
follows demand’s seasonal variations.
#
In view of the equality between supply and demand and since q ∈ F , we deduce from
equation (17) (respectively (18)) that the sign of the multiplier µ1 (respectively µ2) is strictly
positive. By symmetry, the Lagrange multiplier µt is strictly positive (µt > 0) for all t. Con-
sequently, in view of equations (19) and (20), the multiplier λ13 (respectively λ
k
j ) has a strictly
negative sign. Indeed, if an additional unit of nuclear fuel became available for the unit j du-
ring the campaign k, the non-nuclear thermal production would decrease which would lead to a
lower market price and thus to a lower production value and the nuclear production cost would
increase while the non-nuclear thermal production cost would decrease. However, the first ef-
fect that concerns the decrease of the production value is the most important. Consequently,
the “additional” profit resulting from an additional nuclear fuel unit and thus the value of the
multiplier λkj should be negative. The multiplier λ
k
j indicates the “marginal value of nuclear
fuel stock”, i.e. the additional profit |λkj | unit j would get if the nuclear fuel stock decreased
by one unit during the campaign k.
Let us notice that F is not a compact set, thus the inter-temporal profit maximization
problem may not have a solution on F . Consequently, the existence of a solution of the problem
(15) on F takes the form of an assumption in Proposition 4.3.
We now proceed by showing that a constant monthly nuclear production constitutes a
sufficient condition for optimality on C. Let us state the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4 If ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1 is a production vector belonging to F
th such that qnuc1 =
qnuc2 = · · · = qnucT , where (qnuct )Tt=1 is the corresponding monthly nuclear production vector then
((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1 is a solution of the inter-temporal profit maximization problem on C.
Proof
In view of Corollary 4.1, it suffices to show that q = ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1 is a solution of the
inter-temporal profit maximization problem on F th. More precisely, it is sufficient to prove that
there exist Lagrange multipliers such that the KKT conditions associated with this optimization
problem are satisfied at q given that the inter-temporal profit function is concave. In order to
show the concavity of this function, we proceed with the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.1 The profit function of the inter-temporal profit maximization problem on F th is
concave.
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Proof of Lemma 4.1
The inter-temporal profit pi is a quadratic function of the non-nuclear thermal production
qtht on F
th given by the function (16)
−cth
T∑
t=1
(qtht )
2 + 2cth
T∑
t=1
(Dt −QhydTot,t)qtht + c
(see proof of Proposition 4.3). We notice that this is a quadratic function of the form f(u) =
a(uT ·u)+bu+c, where a = −cth and b = 2cth
∑T
t=1(Dt−QhydTot,t). Since a < 0, the function f(u)
is concave. It is also a strictly concave function. Thus, taking into account the other variables,
we conclude that the inter-temporal profit function (16) is concave.
#
Let us now continue our proof.
First, we set the Lagrange multipliers associated with the min/max nuclear production
constraints and with the min/max non-nuclear thermal production constraints equal to zero.
Hence, given that the nuclear fuel constraints as well as the supply-demand equilibrium con-
straints are pure equalities, KKT complementary conditions are satisfied at ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1.
Then, we look at the Lagrange multipliers associated with the supply-demand equilibrium con-
straint in month t (µ˜t) and the nuclear fuel constraints of the unit j during the campaign k
(λ˜kj ). We set {
µ˜t = 2cth((Dt −QhydTot,t)− qtht ) = 2cthqnuct , for all t
Since qnuc1 = q
nuc
2 = · · · = qnucT , we deduce that µ˜1 = µ˜2 = · · · = µ˜T . We call µ˜ their common
value and we set {
λ˜kj = −µ˜, for all j, k
For those multipliers the Lagrangien function of the optimal production problem is deter-
mined on F th as following
H(q) = pi − σ˜ · (Dq − E)
where σ˜ = (µ˜t, λ˜kj ). We recognize then the reduced Lagrangien function L of the optimal
production problem (15). By taking the analysis of (17) respectively (19) and by symmetry,
we realize that
∂L
∂qtht
(q) = 0, for all t
respectively
∂L
∂qnucjt
(q) = 0, for all j, t.
Consequently, the production vector ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1 is also a solution of the KKT con-
ditions associated with the inter-temporal profit maximization problem determined on the set
F th. However, KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality since the objective function (profit
function) is concave. Thus, ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1 is a solution of the inter-temporal profit maxi-
mization problem on F th and the proposition is proved.
#
In view of Propositions 4.3 and 4.4, we conclude that in the absence of binding productions
constraints, the solutions of the optimal inter-temporal production problem are fully charac-
terized by a constant nuclear production. Consequently, from a theoretical point of view, a
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producer maximizes its inter-temporal profit by running its nuclear units in a constant way and
by using its non-nuclear thermal units to follow-up load in order to cover the residual demand
each month. However, since nuclear does not follow-up load and the nuclear fuel stock that
is reloaded in the reservoir corresponds to 258 days equivalent to full capacity, nuclear plants
never operate at maximum capacity during the year.
5 Numerical Illustration
5.1 Data
The data used in our numerical dynamic model has been already used in our previous paper.
It is French and of different years due to the difficulty of collection: ∗ level of French demand
during the year 2006 − 2007, ∗ generation capacity of hydro (run-of-river), nuclear and non-
nuclear thermal and ∗ nuclear fuel stock of reloading, ∗ fixed and variable costs of nuclear,
coal and gas generation. The French Transmission & System Operator (named RTE) gives
the daily consumption in MWh for the entire year 2007 with which we determine the monthly
consumption. RTE also provides the annual capacity of nuclear as well as the annual capacity
of gas and coal for the year 2009. In addition, the nuclear fuel stock of reloading as well as the
annual capacity and production of hydro have been provided by (Electricite´ de France). The
costs of production come from the official report “Reference Costs of Electricity Production”
issued by the ministry of industry (General Direction of Energy and Raw Materials -DIDEME-)
(See Ref. [16]) in 2003. It gives the total cost for each technology (nuclear, coal, gas, fuel) as
follows: cost of investment, variable and fixed cost of exploitation, fuel cost, taxes, R&D costs
for the nuclear and cost of CO2 per ton in the case of coal and gas for a base load (8760h)
and semi-base (3000h) operation. These costs are estimated for the year 2007 and 2015 with
different discount rate (3%, 5%, 8%, 11%) taking into account the influence of exchange rate
on the production cost.
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Figure 1: Availability of nuclear units.
Our modelling is based on the scenario which is also considered by the optimization per
month production behavior modelling. According to this scenario, one dollar is equal to one
euro, the discount rate is 8%, the cost of CO2 per ton reaches 20 euros, the price of coal is
30 dollars per ton and the price of gas is 3.3 dollars per MBtu (1 MBtu=293.1 KWh). The
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choice of this particular scenario is mainly based on the scenario considered by DGEMP &
DIDEME for the estimation of costs of the different types of generation technologies. The
value of the coefficient ath involved in the non-nuclear thermal cost function corresponds to
the fixed cost provided by the data (investment cost, fixed exploitation cost, taxes), while the
other coefficients have been determined by interpolation in order to meet the variable cost of
coal and gas provided by our data base (fuel cost, variable exploitation cost, CO2 cost, taxes on
the gas fuel). The consideration of the fixed costs in the production cost of both technologies
(nuclear, non-nuclear thermal) permits to obtain a more realistic vision of the value of profit
within our medium-term horizon. The capacity of each nuclear unit has been simulated9 in
order to approximate the graph of figure10 1, which shows the availability of nuclear units per
week. For example, the capacity of the nuclear unit j = 1 (respectively j = 2, · · · , j = 12)
corresponds to the sum of capacities of shut-downed units in December (respectively January,
· · · , November). Moreover, the initial value of the nuclear fuel stock has been set by simulating
the nuclear fuel stock of each unit available at the beginning of the time horizon of the model.
We also take into account the electricity losses of the network, as estimated by RTE. Finally,
as we mentioned in the first chapter, an EPR reactor can maneuver between 25% of nominal
capacity and 100% of nominal capacity in order to follow-up load. We take into account these
levels of maneuverability within our numerical model to determine the minimum/maximum
nuclear production constraints (see Table 2, section 9).
A more complete analysis of this data can be found in our previous chapter.
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Figure 2: Simulated demand (in MW)
9Access to detailed nuclear capacity data for each short period of time is not possible due to the confidentiality
of such data.
10Each blue bar shows the number of shut-downed units during a week and the red line shows the evolution of
the consumption over time. The different levels of consumption are measured in the right axe while the number
of shut-downed units is reflected in the left axe.
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The levels of monthly demand11 obtained with the time scale of our model (January 2007
− December 2009) are presented in the figure 2 (we suppose an augmentation of the demand
by a rate of 1% per year). Once again, we can see the seasonal variation of the demand level
between winter (high demand) and summer (low demand). In particular, we observe high
levels of demand during winter (November − February) with demand peaks in December. The
demand decreases considerably during spring as well as during summer (May − August). Let
us recall that no demand peaks are observed during summer period which implies the absence
of significant extremes of temperature.
5.2 Simulation results
In this section, we proceed with an analysis of the numerical results for the nuclear and non-
nuclear thermal production levels as well as the storage levels obtained via a simple numerical
model.
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Figure 3: Simulated hydro/nuclear/non-nuclear thermal production (in MW)
11Note that there is a rescalling on these data in order to take into account the diversity on the length of the
months.
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Figure 4: Simulated nuclear production (in MW)
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Figure 5: Simulated non-nuclear thermal production (in MW)
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Figure 6: Simulated nuclear fuel stock (in MW)
Since the hypothesis of Proposition 4.2 holds within our data, the discontinuity (more
precisely the decrease) of the price at production vectors characterized by zero non-nuclear
thermal production induces a decrease of the value of profit. Let us emphasize that it does
not exist an algorithm that maximizes a discontinuous function. In an alternative model, we
give to the price the value of the non-nuclear thermal marginal cost (mcth(0) = bth) instead of
(bnuc) during periods when nuclear is the marginal technology. Thus, a nuclear producer pays
at least bth in marginal nuclear. In view of this “regularization” of the merit order price, the
inter-temporal profit is maximized on the entire set of feasible solutions C within our numerical
model. However, the “regularized” problem differs from the economical problem described in
subsection 2.6 with respect to the objective function. More precisely, the inter-temporal profit of
this problem is greater than the inter-temporal profit of the economical problem since the value
of bth (26.24 Euro/MWh) is greater than the value of bnuc (5.01 Euro/MWh). Nevertheless, the
value of the “regularized” problem and the value of the economical problem are identical (see
Annex, Proposition 8.1), hence the “regularized” problem is a “good” approximation of our
economical problem (see Ref. [30]). We also prove that the set of solutions of the economical
problem is given by the intersection of the set of solutions of the “regularized” problem and the
set F th (see Annex, Proposition 8.6). The solution of the “regularized” problem whose graphs
appear in this section does not belong to the set F th which means that the set of solutions of
the economical problem is empty (see Annex, Proposition 8.7). This numerical solution is only
an “approximate” solution of our economical problem.
We recall that under some assumptions, Proposition 4.3 shows that the non-nuclear thermal
production is adjusted on the seasonal variations of the demand, while the nuclear production
remains constant during the entire time horizon of the model. However, in view of our data, a
constant nuclear production is not a feasible solution in the case of a flexible nuclear set (like
the French nuclear set) because it leads to the violation of both minimum et maximum non-
nuclear thermal production constraints (see Figure 8). Consequently, Proposition 4.3 says that
the inter-temporal profit maximization problem has no solutions on F within our numerical
model.
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Figure 7: Simulated “regularized” price (in Euro/MWh)/Aggregated total “regularized” profit
(in Euro (million))
Simulation results show that the non-nuclear thermal generation is marginal during the
months of high demand in order to equilibrate supply and demand while the nuclear tech-
nology is marginal during the months of low demand. In particular, nuclear stays marginal
during almost the entire period of spring and summer (April - September), while non-nuclear
is marginal during autumn and winter (October - March) (see Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5).
In addition, one observes (both graphically and with a numerical test) that the non-nuclear
thermal and the nuclear production increase (and respectively decrease) simultaneously during
almost the entire time horizon of our model, which corresponds to the notion of “comonotoni-
city”12 introduced by Yaari (1987) (see Figure 3). However, the monthly nuclear production
never reaches its maximum value13 whereas non-nuclear thermal production reaches its maxi-
mum value14 during demand peaks in December (see Figure 4, Figure 5).
12The vector (Xt)Tt=1 is comonotonic to the vector (Yt)Tt=1 if (Xt′ −Xt)(Yt′ − Yt) ! 0 holds for all t, t′.
13The maximum nuclear production during the month t given that some unit is inactive during this month
(month of reloading) is represented by the purple dotted line. This quantity is obviously below the nominal
capacity of the French nuclear set represented by the crossed purple line.
14The maximum non-nuclear thermal production during a month is represented by the white blue dotted line
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Figure 8: Simulated non-nuclear thermal production resulting from a constant nuclear produc-
tion (in MW)
The nuclear production follows the seasonal variations of demand (high production during
winter − low production during summer). This means “ high ” levels of nuclear fuel stock
during summer and “low” levels of nuclear fuel stock during winter. Therefore, the periodical
evolution of the nuclear production leads to a periodical evolution for the nuclear fuel stock too.
Note that the trend of the stock oscillates around the “stock of reference”15. More precisely,
the value of the stock exceeds the “stock of reference” during high demand seasons while it is
lower than the “stock of reference” during low demand seasons (see Figure 4, Figure 6).
Since the non-nuclear thermal production is comonotonic to the nuclear production and
obviously to itself and by taking into account the equilibrium between supply and demand, we
deduce that the non-nuclear thermal production is comonotonic to the demand, hence it is high
during winter (respectively low during summer) because of the high (respectively low) level of
demand. In particular, non-nuclear thermal production is increasing during winter (beginning
from October) until it reaches its peak value during the month of December. Afterwards, it
decreases progressively until it takes its lowest value during summer which is a low demand
season. However, it does not stay marginal during summer; nuclear is the marginal technology
during the low demand seasons (April - September) through the entire time horizon of the model
(see Figure 5). The main reason of the high duration of nuclear’s marginality is its profitability
for the producers. Since the value of the price, when nuclear is the marginal technology, is given
by the value of the non-nuclear thermal marginal cost (mcth(0) = bth), the nuclear production
is evaluated in a higher price. Consequently, producers are no longer penalized by producing
in marginal nuclear.
Furthermore, we observe that the “regularized” price16 is high during winter by taking its
highest value in the month of December and relatively low during summer. Once more this
and corresponds to the nominal non-nuclear thermal capacity (including coal, gas, fuel, etc.) of the French set.
15The “stock of reference” is represented by the blue dotted line which shows the value of stock at the
beginning, being also the value of stock at the end.
16The red dotted line indicates the level of the “regularized” price when nuclear is the marginal technology.
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is explained by the fact that the “regularized” price (determined by the non-nuclear thermal
marginal cost) is comonotonic to the non-nuclear thermal production which is comonotonic
to the demand. Hence, it follows demand’s seasonal variations. Similarly, the aggregate total
profit being comonotonic to the price is comonotonic to the demand which leads to high profits
during winter and at the beginning of spring while lower profits are realized during summer
and at the end of spring. In addition, we can see that its value can be decomposed in a cyclical
component and a linear trend which is increasing (see Figure 7). However the reader should not
focus on the precise amount of profit since its level depends on the too many approximations
we did do (euro/dollar, oil prices, CO2 cost, discounting rate, no mark-up rate, absence of
profits coming from the hydro technology (run-of-river), etc) and because our modelling does
not take into account the electricity importations/exportations or the production coming from
renewable.
Let us also remark that varying the length of the model’s time horizon does not lead to dif-
ferent behaviour patterns since the periodical evolution of the nuclear and non-nuclear thermal
production during the entire time horizon is the same (e.g. for T = 84, see Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Simulated hydro/nuclear/non-nuclear thermal production (in MW) (T=84)
It should be mentioned that, within this time scale, the size of the French nuclear set
does not seem to be considerably below the “optimal size”. Hence, we do not meet Spector’s
conclusion according to which the French nuclear set is “sub-optimal”, which makes the owner
of that set (the French state) recipient of a scarcity rent (see Ref. [9], Ref. [10]). In addition,
we determine the average nuclear cost estimated here at 37.25 euros per MWh. This price is
very close to the range of nuclear electricity prices appeared in the analysis of the Commission
for Energy Regulation (CRE), which considered in 2010 a fair price (...) between 37.5 and
38.8 euros per MWh (see Ref. [22]). Furthermore, we determine the threshold of profitability
of the non-nuclear thermal production realized by N producers during the month t (θN) by
taking the profit resulting from the aggregated total monthly non-nuclear thermal production
equal to zero: θN = N
√
ath
cth . If the monthly non-nuclear thermal production level realized by
the N producers is higher (lower) than θN , then the profit is positive (negative). In view of
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Proposition 2.1 and for a given total non-nuclear thermal capacity (independent of N) divided
in N identical producers, one has θ1 = · · · = θN which means that the threshold of profitability
of the non-nuclear thermal production θN does not depend on N . The value of the threshold
of profitability17 provided by our numerical model is θ ∼= 18 GW (or equivalently 13 TWh),
hence it exceeds the level of the monthly non-nuclear thermal capacity Qth,Totmax (see Table 2,
section 9) which leads to negative non-nuclear thermal profits through the entire period T (see
Figure 5, Figure 10). Hence, if we take into consideration the too many approximations that we
did do (in particular the absence of the mark-up rate), the total monthly non-nuclear thermal
production cost is never covered.
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Figure 10: Aggregated total non-nuclear thermal profit (in Euro (million))
5.3 Optimal inter-temporal production problem V S Optimal per
month production problem
In our previous paper, we modelled the effects of a flexible nuclear fuel reservoir operation via an
optimal per month production problem, which consists of the maximization of the production
value during a month given the production of the previous month. In this paper, we realize
an inter-temporal optimization which is a mode of operation based on the direct optimization
of the production over the whole game (36 months). In order to obtain an optimal per month
production problem comparable with the optimal inter-temporal production problem treated
by our numerical model (the “regularized” problem) with respect to the value of profit, nuclear
is paid at price (bth), when it is the marginal technology, in both numerical models. This
explains why figure 11 is not the one of our previous paper.
The optimal per month production problem provides us with a “local” optimum, thus
with a solution that is optimal within a subset of feasible points. By contrast, the optimal
inter-temporal production problem determines a global optimum which is the optimal solution
17In figure 5, the red crossed line represents the threshold of profitability of the non-nuclear thermal produc-
tion.
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among all possible solutions. Consequently, from a theoretical point of view, the optimal profit
of production’s inter-temporal optimization has to be greater than the optimal profit resulting
from production’s per month optimization. Indeed, our numerical results show that the value
of the aggregate profit over the entire period T is more important when the value of generation
is maximized over the whole time horizon of the model than in the case of a maximization on
a monthly basis operation’s horizon (see Table 4, section 9).
We also remark that the inter-temporal optimization approach provides us with higher
profits during winter because of the relatively higher prices and lower profits during summer
because of the relatively lower prices with respect to the optimization per month approach.
Moreover, we observe that its value is decomposed in a cyclical component and a linear trend
that increases progressively from one year to another in both cases (see Figure 7, Figure 11).
However, we do not observe an “insufficiency” with respect to the size of the French nuclear
set in both numerical exercises.
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Figure 11: Simulated “regularized” price (in Euro/MWh)/ Aggregated total “regularized” profit
(in Euro (million)) resulting from the optimal per month production problem
A difference that could be mentioned between the optimal inter-temporal production prob-
lem resolved within our numerical model (the “regularized” problem) and the optimal per
month production problem concerns the duration of marginality of nuclear. In our numerical
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model, nuclear is paid at price bth which means that there is no penalty coming from the exclu-
sive use of nuclear generation. Hence, being in marginal nuclear during periods of low demand
(summer) is profitable for a producer. Indeed, we observe that the non-nuclear thermal tech-
nology is marginal only during the months of high demand in the inter-temporal optimization
case while it remains marginal during most of the months of period T in the optimization per
month case (see Figure 3, Figure 12).
It should be noticed that the discontinuity of the price observed at production vectors with
zero levels of non-nuclear thermal production poses an “economical problem”. More precisely,
a producer, who covers the monthly levels of demand during summer (low demand season)
by running only its nuclear units, is penalized since its nuclear production is evaluated at a
low price (bnuc). This price does not allow the amortization of the important fixed costs of
nuclear. Hence, by realizing an infinitesimal nuclear capacity withholding, the non-nuclear
thermal technology becomes the marginal technology that leads prices to a higher level (almost
equal to bth) which justifies our “regularization” of the price merit order rule.
We remind that the production levels resulting from the “regularized” problem, constitute an
“approximate” solution of our economical problem described in the subsection 2.6. Therefore,
we do not proceed with an exhaustive comparison of the nuclear and the non-nuclear thermal
production decisions as well as of the storage decisions obtained by the “regularized” problem
and the optimal per month production problem.
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Figure 12: Simulated hydro/nuclear/non-nuclear thermal production (in MW) resulting from
the optimal per month production problem
Finally, let us remark that a prolongation of the time horizon of the model T does not
change producer’s behaviour in both cases (see Figure 9, Figure 13).
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Figure 13: Simulated hydro/nuclear/non-nuclear thermal production (in MW) resulting from
the optimal per month production problem (T=84)
6 Maximization of social welfare
In this section, we study the maximization of social welfare in a competitive electricity market in
which there exist two types of generation: nuclear and non-nuclear thermal. We are interested
in the decisions of the actors of the market (consumers and producers) that result from the
maximization of the total utility of the society by taking into consideration the generation
capacity constraints as well as the fuel storage constraints and the supply-demand equilibrium
constraints within a medium-term horizon characterized by demand’s seasonal variations.
6.1 A property of the “interior” solutions
The maximization of social welfare is an optimization problem which consists to the maximiza-
tion of the total surplus. Total surplus is equal to consumer surplus (denoted by SC) associated
with a given level of production plus producer surplus (denoted by SP). Consumer surplus is
the difference between the total amount that consumers are willing and able to pay for electric-
ity and the total amount that they actually do pay (electricity evaluated at the market price)
(see Ref. [27]). The surplus of producer is equal to its revenue minus the variable costs or
equivalently to the profit increased by the fixed costs (see Ref. [24], Ref. [27]). Without loss of
generality, we may translate producers surplus by the fixed costs.
The social welfare maximization problem is
max
((qnucjt )
J
j=1,q
th
t )
T
t=1∈C
T∑
t=1
(
SC(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t ) + SP (
J∑
j=1
qnucjt , q
th
t )
)
Thus, we have to solve
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max
((qnucjt )
J
j=1,q
th
t )
T
t=1∈C
T∑
t=1
([
∫ ∞
pt
Dt(p
∗
t )dp
∗
t ] + [pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )−
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt )− Cth(qtht )])
or equivalently
max
((qnucjt )
J
j=1,q
th
t )
T
t=1∈C
T∑
t=1
([
∫ ∞
0
Dt(p
∗
t )dp
∗
t − pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )]
+[pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )−
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt )− Cth(qtht )])
where Dt(.) is the demand function at time t (supposed here constant). We recall that pt
is given by the supply-demand equilibrium. However, the formula defining consumer surplus
does not make sense in the presence of inelastic demand (infinite value of surplus). In view of
this remark, we focus on the variation of consumer surplus. Nevertheless, the infinite value of
consumers surplus leads to an indeterminate form of the variation of consumers surplus. For
this reason, we introduce here a definition of the variation of consumer surplus when the price
evolves from pt which is a level of reference to pt given by the following formula (∆) which is
true in the classical case (case of an affine demand). More precisely, we have
∆ = −
∫ pt
pt
Dt(p
∗
t )dp
∗
t = −Dt(pt − pt) = Dtpt −Dtpt = (
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )pt − (
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )pt
In view of these remarks, we will maximize the function
T∑
t=1
([Constant− pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )] + [pt(
J∑
j=1
qnucjt + q
th
t )−
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt )− Cth(qtht )])
Thus, the social welfare maximization problem can be written as
max
((qnucjt )
J
j=1,q
th
t )
T
t=1∈C
T∑
t=1
(Constant−
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt )− Cth(qtht ))
or equivalently
min
((qnucjt )
J
j=1,q
th
t )
T
t=1∈C
T∑
t=1
(
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt ) + C
th(qtht )) (21)
Thus, we deduce that the social welfare maximization problem is equivalent to the total
cost minimization problem (21) (same set of solutions). If the solution of the social welfare
maximization problem belongs to F , we obtain a property given by the following proposition.
Let us notice that the proof of this proposition is similar to the one of Proposition 4.3.
Proposition 6.1 If there exists a solution ((qˆnucjt )
J
j=1, qˆ
th
t )
T
t=1 ∈ F such that the social welfare
is maximum on C then qˆth1 = qˆ
th
2 = · · · = qˆthT .
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Proof
The production vector qˆ = ((qˆnucjt )
J
j=1, qˆ
th
t )
T
t=1 solves the equivalent with the social welfare
maximization problem, total cost minimization problem (21)
min
((qnucjt )
J
j=1,q
th
t )
T
t=1∈C
T∑
t=1
(
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt ) + C
th(qtht ))
We choose to apply the Karush - Kuhn - Tucker (KKT) conditions in order to determine
an optimal solution of the problem (21). Let us recall that M is an affine set, hence Slater’s
condition is satisfied. Thus, there exists (µt)
T
t=1 ∈ RT and (λkj )Jj=1 ∈ R(J−2)4+6 such that
the KKT conditions are satisfied, where µt denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the supply-
demand equilibrium constraint at each month t and λ
k
j is the Lagrange multiplier for the
nuclear fuel constraint of the unit j during the campaign k. According to the KKT conditions
of complementarity and since qˆ ∈ F , all the Lagrange multipliers associated with the min/max
production constraints are equal to zero and they will be omitted in the Lagrangien function
of this problem.
We call L the reduced Lagrangien of the cost minimization problem (21)
L(q) =
T∑
t=1
(
J∑
j=1
(Cnucj (q
nuc
jt ) + C
th(qtht ))− σ(Dq − E)
where q = ((qnucjt )
J
j=1, q
th
t )
T
t=1 is a production vector belonging to C and σ = (λ
k
j , µt) is the vector
of the Lagrange multipliers. We recall from the proof of Proposition 4.3 that the vector E and
the matrix D are defined so that M = {q′ s.t. Dq′ − E = 0}.
Following some calculations and with the help of the supply-demand equilibrium constraints,
we deduce the objective function of the cost minimization problem (21) is a quadratic function
of the non-nuclear thermal production qtht
cth
T∑
t=1
(qtht )
2 + d (22)
where d = (
∑T
t=1 ath +
∑T
t=1
∑J
j=1 a
j
nuc + bth((Dt−QhydTot,t)−Sreload)+ bnucSreload) is the constant
part of the function.
According to the KKT conditions, we have
∂L
∂qnucjt
(qˆ) = 0, for all j, t
and
∂L
∂qtht
(qˆ) = 0, for all t.
The derivative of Lagrangien with respect to the thermal production qth1 at month 1 is
∂L
∂qth1
(qˆ) = 2cthqˆ
th
1 − µ1 = 0⇔ qˆth1 =
µ1
2cth
(23)
Symmetrically, the derivative of Lagrangien with respect to the thermal production qth2 at month
2 is
∂L
∂qth2
(qˆ) = 2cthqˆ
th
2 − µ2 = 0⇔ qˆth2 =
µ2
2cth
(24)
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To compare the Lagrange multipliers µ1 and µ2, we focus on a unit that is active during month
1 and 2. The derivative of Lagrangien with respect to the nuclear production qnuc31 of unit 3 at
month 1 is
∂L
∂qnuc31
(qˆ) = −µ1 − λ13 = 0⇔ µ1 = −λ13 (25)
The derivative of Lagrangien with respect to the nuclear production qnuc32 of unit 3 at month 2
is
∂L
∂qnuc32
(qˆ) = −µ2 − λ13 = 0⇔ µ2 = −λ13 (26)
From the last two equations, we deduce that µ1 = µ2. This means that
qˆth1 =
µ1
2cth
=
µ2
2cth
= qˆth2
By using a unit available at month t and t+1, we obtain µt = µt+1, which means that qˆ
th
t = qˆ
th
t+1.
Thus,
qˆth1 = qˆ
th
2 = · · · = qˆthT
Consequently, we conclude that a solution of the total cost minimization problem (21) is
determined by a non-nuclear thermal production that is constant during the entire time horizon
of our model and a variable nuclear production which entirely follows the seasonal variations
of the demand.
#
Since qˆ ∈ F , the equation (23) (respectively (24)) implies that the sign of the multiplier µ1
(respectively µ2) is strictly positive. By a symmetric argument, the Lagrange multiplier µt is
strictly positive (µt > 0) for all t. Hence, in view of equations (25) and (26), the multiplier
λ
1
3 (respectively λ
k
j ) is strictly negative. Indeed, if an additional unit of nuclear fuel became
available for the unit j during the campaign k, the non-nuclear thermal production would de-
crease which would lead to the augmentation of the nuclear production cost and the diminution
of the non-nuclear thermal production cost. However, the second effect, thus the decrease of
the non-nuclear thermal production cost is the most important. Consequently, the “additional”
cost resulting from an additional nuclear fuel unit and thus the value of the multiplier λ
k
j should
be negative. The multiplier λ
k
j indicates the “marginal value of nuclear fuel stock”, i.e. the
additional cost |λkj | unit j would incur if the nuclear fuel stock decreased by one unit during
the campaign k.
We remind that C is a compact set, thus the total cost minimization problem has solutions
on C. Nevertheless, it may not have solutions on the set F since it is not compact. Hence, the
existence of a solution of the problem (21) on F has the form of assumption in Proposition 6.1.
Let us now proceed with a proposition which shows that a constant non-nuclear thermal
production is a sufficient condition for optimality on C. The proof of this proposition resembles
the proof of Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 6.2 If ((qˆnucjt )
J
j=1, qˆ
th
t )
T
t=1 is a production vector belonging to C such that qˆ
th
1 =
qˆth2 = · · · = qˆthT then ((qˆnucjt )Jj=1, qˆtht )Tt=1 is a solution of the social welfare maximization problem
(equivalently total cost minimization problem) on C.
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Proof
In order to prove Proposition 6.2, we need to show that the production vector qˆ = ((qˆnucjt )
J
j=1,
qˆtht )
T
t=1 is a solution of the total cost minimization problem on C. Thus, it suffices to show that
there exist Lagrange multipliers such that the associated with the problem (21) KKT conditions
are satisfied at qˆ given that the objective function of this problem is convex. We show the
convexity of the total production cost by stating the following Lemma.
Lemma 6.1 The total production cost function of the total cost minimization problem on C is
convex.
Proof of Lemma 6.1
The total production cost
T∑
t=1
(
J∑
j=1
Cnucj (q
nuc
jt ) + C
th(qtht ))
is a quadratic function of the non-nuclear thermal production qtht provided by the function (22)
cth
T∑
t=1
(qtht )
2 + d
(see proof of Proposition 6.1). We remark that (22) is a quadratic function of the form g(u) =
α(uT · u) + d, where α = cth. Since α > 0, the function g(u) is convex. Moreover, it is strictly
convex. Consequently, taking into consideration the other variables, we conclude that the total
production cost function (22) is convex.
#
By setting the Lagrange multipliers associated with the min/max production constraints
equal to zero and since the nuclear fuel constraints as well as the supply-demand equilibrium
constraints are pure equalities, we deduce that the KKT complementary conditions are satisfied
at ((qˆnucjt )
J
j=1, qˆ
th
t )
T
t=1. Then, we proceed with the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
supply-demand equilibrium constraint in month t (µ˜t) and the nuclear fuel constraints of the
unit j during the campaign k (λ˜
k
j ). We set{
µ˜t = 2cthqˆ
th
t , for all t
In view of the constant non-nuclear thermal production (qˆth1 = qˆ
th
2 = · · · = qˆthT ), we deduce
that µ˜1 = µ˜2 = · · · = µ˜T . Hence, we set{
λ˜
k
j = −µ˜, for all j, k
where µ˜ is the common value of the multipliers (µ˜t)
T
t=1.
For those multipliers the Lagrangien function of the total cost minimization problem on C
has the following form
H(q) =
T∑
t=1
(
J∑
j=1
(Cnucj (q
nuc
jt ) + C
th(qtht ))− σ˜(Dq − E)
where σ˜ = (µ˜t, λ˜
k
j ). We can see then that the Lagrangien H coincides with the reduced
Lagrangien L of the total cost minimization problem (21).
In view of the analysis of (23) respectively (25) and by a symmetric argument, we realize
that
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∂L
∂qtht
(qˆ) = 0, for all t
respectively
∂L
∂qnucjt
(qˆ) = 0, for all j, t.
Consequently, the production vector ((qˆnucjt )
J
j=1, qˆ
th
t )
T
t=1 is a solution of the KKT conditions
associated with the total cost minimization problem determined on C. In addition, KKT condi-
tions provide us with solutions that minimize the total production cost on C, since the objective
function (total production cost function) is convex. Thus, a production vector ((qˆnucjt )
J
j=1, qˆ
th
t )
T
t=1
of the set C that is characterized by a constant non-nuclear thermal production is a solution
of the total cost minimization problem on C.
#
In view of propositions 6.1 and 6.2, we conclude that in the absence of binding production
constraints, the optimal production vectors that maximize the social welfare in a competitive
electricity market are such that the non-nuclear thermal generation units run all the time in a
constant way to meet the demand, and thus the nuclear is entirely used to follow-up load. This
means that the social planner chooses to produce the same quantity of non-nuclear thermal
each month to cover the demand even during months of low demand, so it uses nuclear to follow
the seasonal variations of the demand. Consequently, prices are determined permanently by
the marginal cost of fossil fuel technologies and hence, they stay constant during the entire
time horizon of the model. In addition, in view of the non-binding production constraints the
nuclear units produce less than its maximum capacity during all months.
6.2 Numerical Illustration
In this section, we present the nuclear and non-nuclear thermal production levels as well as the
storage levels resulting from the social welfare maximization problem, via a simple numerical
model by using Scilab. Let us notice that the data used in this numerical model has been
already used in section 5.
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Figure 14: Simulated hydro/nuclear/non-nuclear thermal production (in MW)
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Figure 15: Simulated nuclear production (in MW)
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.74
40
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Thermal Production
Time
Figure 16: Simulated non-nuclear thermal production (in MW)
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Figure 17: Simulated nuclear fuel stock (in MW)
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Figure 18: Simulated price (in Euro/MWh)/Aggregated total profit (in Euro (million))
General simulation results
In our numerical model, we maximize social welfare (equivalently we minimize total pro-
duction cost) on the entire set of feasible solutions C.
Simulations results obtained by our numerical model show that nuclear entirely follows the
seasonal variations of the demand by decreasing during summer and increasing during winter
while non-nuclear thermal is constant during the entire time horizon of our model without
saturating the minimum/maximum non-nuclear thermal production constraints. Thus, the
non-nuclear thermal generation remains marginal during the entire time horizon of the model
while the nuclear technology is never marginal, even during the months of low demand (see
Figure 14, Figure 15, Figure 16). Furthermore, we verify (through a numerical test) that
the numerical solution described in this section belongs to F which shows that Proposition
6.1 is applicable since the non-nuclear thermal component of this solution is constant. We
also deduce that Proposition 6.2 is applied within our numerical model since we find that a
production vector belonging to C such that the non-nuclear thermal production is constant
is a solution of the social welfare maximization problem. It should be noticed that the strict
convexity of the total cost function with respect to the non-nuclear thermal production (see
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Figure 19: Aggregated total cost (in Euro (million))
proof of Lemma 6.1) implies the unicity of solutions with respect to the non-nuclear thermal
component which in view of Proposition 6.1 is constant. However, taking into account the other
variables the total cost function is convex, thus the entire solution is not unique (see Lemma
6.1).
Moreover, one observes that the monthly nuclear production as well as the monthly non-
nuclear thermal production never reach their maximum value (see Figure 15, Figure 16). In
addition, we obtain “high” levels of nuclear fuel stock during summer and “low” levels of
nuclear fuel stock during winter because of the seasonality that characterizes the variations
of the nuclear production (high production during winter – low production during summer).
Consequently, we observe a periodical evolution for the nuclear fuel stock due to the periodical
evolution of the nuclear production as well as an oscillation around the “stock of reference”
(see Figure 15, Figure 17).
The price18 is constant since it is determined by the non-nuclear thermal marginal cost
during the entire period T (see Figure 18). Furthermore, the value of the aggregated total cost
evolutes periodically by increasing during winter and decreasing during summer (see Figure
19). It should be noticed that within this numerical model the aggregated total cost resulting
from the optimal inter-temporal production problem is relatively higher than the aggregated
total cost coming from the optimal per month production problem. As expected the value of
the aggregate total cost resulting from both optimization problems is higher than the optimal
value of the aggregated total cost determined in this section (see Table 5, section 9).
Let us also remark that despite the variations in the temporal horizon of the model the
periodical evolution of the nuclear and non-nuclear thermal production during the entire time
horizon does not change (e.g. for T = 84, see Figure 20).
18The red (respectively yellow) dotted line indicates the price level when nuclear (respectively non-nuclear
thermal) is the marginal technology.
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Figure 20: Aggregated total cost (in Euro)
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the optimal inter-temporal management of a flexible nuclear
generation set in a perfectly competitive regime. Once again, we focused on a “medium-term
approach” which takes into account the seasonal variation of the demand between winter (high
demand) and summer (low demand). As we mentioned in our previous paper, the nuclear fuel
functions like a “reservoir”, which allows different allocations of the nuclear production during
the different demand seasons of the year. In this paper, the modelling of the optimal manage-
ment of a flexible nuclear reservoir consists in maximizing the value of generation during the
whole time horizon T (36 months) and it leads to the determination of the global optimum of
the optimal production problem. We proposed a deterministic multi-period model to study the
perfect competitive case in a market where producers use both nuclear and non-nuclear genera-
tions units. Under the assumption of symmetry of capacity among producers, we demonstrated
that the equilibrium of the optimal inter-temporal production problem is “almost” symmetric.
More precisely, we proved that its non-nuclear thermal component is symmetric while its nu-
clear component is symmetrisable and we focused on the symmetric solution (Proposition 3.1).
We also showed that under some assumptions producer’s inter-temporal profit decreases when
nuclear is the marginal technology which leads us to the exclusion of zero non-nuclear thermal
production levels from the domain of definition of our optimization problem (Proposition 4.2).
Then, we looked at the “interior” optimal solutions and we proved that if such a solution exists
then it is characterized by a constant nuclear production (Proposition 4.3). In addition, we
showed that a production vector with strictly positive non-nuclear thermal production levels
(thus, belonging to F th) characterized by this property is a solution of the inter-temporal profit
maximization problem (Proposition 4.4).
In the following section, we presented a numerical simulation by taking into account the
actual size of a given nuclear set (the French) vis-a`-vis the non-nuclear generation set. We
treated the price discontinuity (more precisely the price decrease), which under some assump-
tions is responsible for the decrease of the inter-temporal profit when the non-nuclear thermal
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units are not actives, by “regularizing” the merit order price. This price “regularization” led to
an alternative optimal inter-temporal production problem (the “regularized” problem) different
from the economical problem (presented in subsection 2.6) by its objective function. However,
as we proved, the value of both optimization problems is identical which allowed us to obtain a
“good” approximation of our economical problem (see Annex, Proposition 8.1). In addition, we
determined the set of solutions of the economical problem as the intersection of the set of solu-
tions of the “regularized” problem and the set F th (see Annex, Proposition 8.6). We deduced
for our numerical example that the set of solutions of the economical problem is empty since
the solution obtained by the “regularized” problem does not belong to the set F th (see Annex,
Proposition 8.7). Nevertheless, this numerical solution is only an “approximate” solution of our
economical problem. It is characterized by high levels of nuclear generation during the months
of high demand (winter) and low levels during the months of low demand (summer) which
confirms the “theoretical” ability of the nuclear generation set to follow-up load variations. As
expected, this leads to low levels of nuclear fuel stock during winter and high levels of nuclear
fuel stock during summer. In addition, we noticed that the values of the nuclear fuel stock
oscillate around the “reference” value of this fuel stock. Moreover, to ensure the equilibrium
between supply and demand during winter, the producer has to take into account the thermal
non-nuclear generation capacity. Non-nuclear thermal generation is marginal only during some
months of the year (months of high demand) since the nuclear production is no more penalized
by a low price within our numerical model. Consequently, the price is determined by the non-
nuclear thermal marginal cost only during high demand’s seasons. In particular, we observed
that market price peaks during winter and reaches its lowest during summer. Accordingly,
producers obtain higher profits during winter and lower profits during summer. It should be
noticed that solutions fully characterized by a constant nuclear production do not exist within
our numerical model because of non-nuclear thermal production constraints. Furthermore, we
drew two interesting conclusions: (i) the average nuclear cost estimated here is close to the
range of nuclear electricity prices (37.5 and 38.8 euros per MWh) given by the Commission for
Energy Regulation (CRE) in 2010, (ii) given the approximations that we did do, a non-nuclear
thermal producer does not cover its total monthly production cost.
Then, the numerical results of the optimal inter-temporal production problem (the “regulari-
zed” problem) were contrasted with the numerical results of the optimal per month production
problem by taking into consideration that nuclear is paid at price bth in both problems when it
is the marginal technology. We did find that producer’s profit is greater in the inter-temporal
optimization case than in the per month optimization case given that in the first case the
producer has “discovered” how competitive wholesale markets work, hence it is interested in
determining the global optimum of the optimal production problem. In addition, a comparison
between the simulated production levels resulting from both optimization problems showed
that the period during which the non-nuclear thermal technology is marginal is longer for the
optimal per month production problem than for the optimal inter-temporal production problem
since price’s “regularization” makes nuclear production profitable for the producer.
Finally, in the last section, we studied the social welfare maximization problem by taking
into account the seasonal variations of the demand (medium-term horizon) in order to deter-
mine social planner’s optimal decisions in a competitive electricity market. After showing the
equivalence between the social welfare maximization problem and the total cost minimization
problem, we demonstrated that the “interior” solutions of the social welfare maximization prob-
lem are characterized by a constant non-nuclear thermal production (Proposition 6.1). Then,
we proved that this property is a sufficient condition for optimality on the entire set of feasible
solutions C meaning that a production vector of C that has this property constitutes a solution
of the social welfare maximization on C. As one might see the production scheduling resulting
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from the social welfare maximization problem is diametrically opposite from the one coming
from the optimal inter-temporal production problem. Simulation results showed that the non-
nuclear thermal production is constant through the entire time horizon of the model forcing
nuclear to follow demand’s seasonal variations (high production levels during winter − low
production levels during summer). Moreover, we observed that this numerical solution belongs
to F , hence the Proposition 6.1 is applicable within our numerical example and we also de-
duced the applicability of Proposition 6.2. As expected, the periodical evolution of the nuclear
production cause the opposite periodical evolution of the nuclear fuel stock. More precisely,
we observed an increase of the nuclear fuel stock during summer and a decrease during winter.
Furthermore, the price is determined only by the non-nuclear thermal generation since it is the
only marginal technology during the entire period T . Hence, the price remains constant over
the whole time horizon of the model. We also noticed the periodical evolution of the aggregated
total cost which increases during winter and decreases during summer.
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.74
46
8 Annex
Let us introduce some notations used in the annex. We call P1 the economical problem (pre-
sented in subsection 2.6)
maxq∈C pi(q)
and P2 the “regularized” problem (presented in subsection 5.2)
maxq∈C ψ(q)
where pi and ψ represent the inter-temporal profit functions of problem P1 and P2 respectively.
We will recall the properties proved in the paper in order to allow a self-content annex to
the maximum extent. Functions pi and ψ are such that pi " ψ on C. This is because pi = ψ on
F th which is a subset of C since the price is determined by the non-nuclear thermal production
in both problems and pi < ψ on C \ F th because when nuclear is marginal, it is paid at price
bth within the “regularized” problem while it is paid bnuc inside the economical problem and
bnuc < bth (see Proposition 4.2). Let us also mention that ψ is a continuous function which, in
addition, is strictly concave with respect to the non-nuclear thermal production qtht (see proof
of Lemma 4.1). Moreover, the set F th is dense in C (see Proposition 4.1).
We are now ready to state the following propositions.
Proposition 8.1 The value of the economical problem (val(P1)) and the value of the “regulari-
zed” problem (val(P2)) are the same ( i.e. val(P1) = val(P2)).
Proof
First, since pi " ψ, we deduce that val(P1) " val(P2).
Secondly, we prove that val(P1) ! val(P2). The set C is compact, hence the set of solutions
of the “regularized” problem is non empty. This means that there exists q ∈ C such that
ψ(q) = val(P2). In view of the density of F th in C, the production vector q ∈ F th. It follows
that there exists a sequence (qh)h∈N such that qh ∈ F th and limh→∞ qh = q. Since pi = ψ on
F th and pi(qh) " val(P1), at the limit we obtain
val(P2) = ψ(q) = lim
h→∞
ψ(qh) = lim
h→∞
pi(qh) " val(P1)
Consequently, the inequality val(P1) ! val(P2) is proved.
From the first and the second part of the proof, we conclude that val(P1) = val(P2).
#
Proposition 8.2 The set of solutions of the economical problem (Sol(P1)) is contained on the
set F th ( i.e. Sol(P1) ⊂ F th).
Proof
If Sol(P1) = ∅ then there is nothing to prove. Let q̂ ∈ Sol(P1). This means that for all
q ∈ C, pi(q) " pi(q̂). Especially, for all q ∈ F th, ψ(q) = pi(q) " pi(q̂) ⇒ ψ(q) " pi(q̂). In
particular, for q = q̂, we obtain ψ(q̂) " pi(q̂) which means that q̂ /∈ C \ F th and thus, q̂ ∈ F th.
Hence, we deduce that Sol(P1) ⊂ F th.
#
Proposition 8.3 The set of solutions of the economical problem (Sol(P1)) is contained on the
set of solutions of the “regularized” problem (Sol(P2)) ( i.e. Sol(P1) ⊂ Sol(P2)).
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Proof
In the case that Sol(P1) = ∅, there is nothing to prove. If Sol(P1) is a non-empty set then
there exists q˜ ∈ Sol(P1), which means that: (i) val(P1) = pi(q˜), (ii) in view of Proposition 8.2,
q˜ ∈ F th, hence ψ(q˜) = pi(q˜). Consequently, we obtain
val(P1) = pi(q˜) = ψ(q˜) " val(P2) = val(P1)⇒ ψ(q˜) = val(P2)
Thus, q˜ ∈ Sol(P2) and the proposition is proved.
#
We will reenforce the last two propositions.
Proposition 8.4 The set of solutions of the economical problem (Sol(P1)) is determined as
following:
Sol(P1) =
{
Sol(P2), if Sol(P2)
⋂
F th %= ∅
∅, otherwise
Proof
If Sol(P2)
⋂
F th %= ∅ then there exists a production vector q such that q ∈ F th and q ∈
Sol(P2). Since q ∈ Sol(P2) one has, for all q ∈ C, ψ(q) " ψ(q). If q ∈ F th then pi(q) = ψ(q) "
ψ(q) = pi(q). If q ∈ C \ F th then pi(q) < ψ(q) " ψ(q) = pi(q). Hence, we conclude that q
corresponds to a solution of the problem P1, which means that Sol(P2) ⊂ Sol(P1). Together
with Proposition 8.3, we obtain Sol(P1) = Sol(P2).
In view of Proposition 8.2, one has Sol(P1) ⊂ F th. In addition, Sol(P1) ⊂ Sol(P2) (see
Proposition 8.3). Consequently, we deduce that Sol(P1) ⊂ Sol(P2)
⋂
F th. If Sol(P2)
⋂
F th = ∅
then Sol(P1) ⊂ ∅ ⇔ Sol(P1) = ∅, thus our economical problem P1 has no solutions, which
concludes our proof.
#
Proposition 8.5 The set of solutions of the “regularized” problem (Sol(P2)) is such that either
Sol(P2) ⊂ F th or Sol(P2) ⊂ C \ F th.
Proof
In view of the strict concavity of the inter-temporal profit function ψ with respect to qtht ,
the non-nuclear thermal component of the solutions of the problem P2 is unique. Consequently,
either Sol(P2) ⊂ F th or Sol(P2) ⊂ C \ F th.
#
Proposition 8.6 The set of solutions of the economical problem (Sol(P1)) and the set of so-
lutions of the “regularized” problem (Sol(P2)) are such that Sol(P1) = Sol(P2)
⋂
F th.
Proof
If Sol(P2)
⋂
F th = ∅ then, according to Proposition 8.4, Sol(P1) = ∅. Consequently,
Sol(P1) = Sol(P2)
⋂
F th.
If Sol(P2)
⋂
F th %= ∅ then, in view of Proposition 8.4, one has Sol(P1) = Sol(P2). However,
from Proposition 8.5, we obtain Sol(P2) ⊂ F th. Thus, Sol(P1) = Sol(P2)
⋂
F th.
#
Proposition 8.7 If q is a production vector that does not belong to F th and q ∈ Sol(P2) (it
constitutes a solution of the “regularized” problem), then Sol(P1) = ∅.
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Proof
In view of the hypothesis, q ∈ Sol(P2) but it is not a production vector of the set F th.
Thus, according to Proposition 8.5, Sol(P2) ⊂ C \ F th. This means that Sol(P2)
⋂
F th = ∅.
Hence, in view of Proposition 8.4 (or equivalently Proposition 8.6), the set of solutions of the
economical problem (Sol(P1)) is empty, which proves our proposition.
#
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9 Tables
In this section, we present the values of the exogenous variables of our numerical model. We
also provide the value of the aggregated total “regularized” profit obtained by the optimal
inter-temporal production problem as well as by the optimal per month production problem.
In addition, we present the value of the aggregated total “regularized” nuclear and non-nuclear
thermal profit. Finally, we give the aggregated total cost and aggregated total variable cost
resulting from all three optimization problems (optimal inter-temporal production problem,
optimal per month production problem, social welfare maximization problem).
Nuclear capacity of unit j (in MW) j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 j = 6
Capacityj,nuc,Tot 201 5641 6758 4359 8838 8045
j = 7 j = 8 j = 9 j = 10 j = 11 j = 12 Total
4923 7956 5634 5950 2972 1723 63000
Table 1
The level of nuclear capacity that the unit j disposes is denoted by Capacityj,nuc,Tot.
Capacity (in MW) Nuclear Non-nuclear thermal Hydro
Qj,nuc,Totmin 0.25× Capacityj,nuc,Tot − −
Qj,nuc,Totmax 1× Capacityj,nuc,Tot − −
Qthmin − 0 −
Qth,Totmax − 15600 −
QhydTot,t − − 4851.6
Stock of reloading
of unit j (in MWh)
Sj,Totreload 1× Capacityj,nuc,Tot ×24× 258 − −
Table 2
where 258 corresponds to the number of days during which a nuclear unit can operate at
full capacity.
Parameters Nuclear Non-nuclear thermal
aj,Totnuc (in Euro) 22.79 ×Capacityj,nuc,Tot × (8760/11) −
bnuc (in Euro/MWh) 5.01 −
aTotth (in Euro) − 11.5× 107
bth (in Euro/MWh) − 26.24
cTotth (in Euro/MWh
2) − 6.76 × 10−7
Table 3
where 22.79 represents the total fixed cost of nuclear in Euro/MWh.
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Optimal inter-temporal Optimal per month
production problem production problem
Aggregated total “regularized”
profit (in Euro) −9.147× 109 −15.130× 109
Aggregated total “regularized”
nuclear profit (in Euro) −5.957× 109 −11.726× 109
Aggregated total “regularized”
non-nuclear thermal profit (in Euro) −3.189× 109 −3.403× 109
Table 4
Social welfare Optimal inter-temporal Optimal per month
maximization problem production problem production problem
Aggregated
total cost (in Euro) 5.209× 1010 5.261× 1010 5.240× 1010
Aggregated variable
total cost (in Euro) 1.023× 1010 1.075× 1010 1.054× 1010
Table 5
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